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Timbs v. Indiana 
 
Ruling Below: State of Indiana v. Tyson Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. 2017) 
 
Overview: Tyson Timbs tried selling drugs to undercover officers resulting in his arrest. As a 
result of pleading guilty to his drug charge, in the State of Indiana Civil Court, Timbs was forced 
to forfeit his Land Rover.  
 
Issue: Whether the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause is incorporated against the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
State of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
v. 
Tyson Timbs, Appellee (Defendant below) 
 
Indiana Supreme Court 
 
Decided on November 2, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
SLAUGHTER, Justice:  
 
The State sought to forfeit 
Defendant’s Land Rover after he used it to 
transport illegal drugs. The trial court held 
the proposed forfeiture would violate the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines 
Clause. We conclude the Excessive Fines 
Clause does not bar the State from forfeiting 
Defendant’s vehicle because the United 
States Supreme Court has not held that the 
Clause applies to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Defendant, Tyson Timbs, used life-
insurance proceeds after his father’s death to 
pay $42,058.30 for a Land Rover in January 
2013. Over the next four months, Timbs 
regularly drove the Land Rover between 
Marion and Richmond, Indiana, to buy and 
transport heroin. Timbs’s trafficking came to 
the attention of a confidential police 
informant, who told a member of the Joint 
Effort Against Narcotics team that he could 
buy heroin from Timbs. Police set up a 
controlled buy, and the informant and an 
undercover detective bought two grams of 
heroin from Timbs for $225. Police made 
another controlled buy a couple of weeks 
later, acquiring another two grams of heroin 
for $160. During the second buy, the 
detective set up a third controlled buy with 
Timbs. The day the third buy was to occur, 
police apprehended Timbs during a traffic 
stop. The Land Rover had 1,237 miles on its 
odometer when Timbs bought it in January, 
and more than 17,000 miles when police 
seized the vehicle in late May. 
 
In June 2013, the State charged Timbs 
with two counts of Class B felony dealing in 
a controlled substance and one count of Class 
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D felony conspiracy to commit theft. Nearly 
two years later, in 2015, Timbs pleaded guilty 
to one count of Class B felony dealing and 
one count of Class D felony conspiracy to 
commit theft in exchange for the State’s 
dismissing the remaining charge. The trial 
court accepted the plea and sentenced Timbs 
to six years, with one year executed in 
community corrections and five years 
suspended to probation. Timbs also agreed to 
pay police costs of $385, an interdiction fee 
of $200, court costs of $168, a bond fee of 
$50, and a $400 fee for undergoing a drug-
and-alcohol assessment with the probation 
department. 
 
Within a couple months of bringing 
criminal charges, the State also sought to 
forfeit the Land Rover. After a bench trial, the 
court issued written findings that denied the 
State’s action, concluding that forfeiture 
would be an excessive fine under the Eighth 
Amendment. “The amount of the forfeiture 
sought is excessive and is grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of the 
Defendant’s offense.” The trial court 
observed that the maximum statutory fine for 
Timbs’s Class B felony was $10,000 on the 
day he was arrested and noted the vehicle was 
worth approximately four times this amount 
when he bought it just a few months earlier. 
The court made no finding about the 
vehicle’s value on Timbs’s arrest date. Based 
on its holding, the court ordered the State to 
release the vehicle immediately. A divided 
Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Timbs, 62 
N.E.3d 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We granted 
transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals’ 
opinion, and now reverse 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 Before addressing whether forfeiture 
of Timbs’s Land Rover would be an 
excessive fine, we must decide the antecedent 
question of whether the Excessive Fines 
Clause applies to forfeitures by the State. 
Whether a Bill of Rights provision applies to 
the States is a purely legal question. We 
review such questions de novo. State v. 
Harper, 8 N.E.3d 694, 696 (Ind. 2014). 
Unlike legal questions, a trial court’s factual 
determinations are reviewed for clear error. 
Fischer v. Heymann, 12 N.E.3d 867, 870 
(Ind. 2014). We will not reweigh evidence or 
determine the credibility of witnesses, and we 
will consider only the evidence favorable to 
the judgment and the logical inferences 
drawn from it. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); Hitch v. 
State, 51 N.E.3d 216, 226 (Ind. 2016). 
 
Discussion and Decision 
I. The United States Supreme Court 
has never enforced the Excessive 
Fines Clause against the States, 
and we opt not to do so here. 
The framers’ original conception was 
settled long ago that the Bill of Rights applies 
only to the national government and cannot 
be enforced against the States. See Barron v. 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
Only after ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did the Supreme Court, in the 
early twentieth century, begin to apply 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights to the 
States through the doctrine of selective 
incorporation. Justice Black’s argument for 
total incorporation of the Bill of Rights, see, 
e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-
72, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), has 
never carried the day. McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761-63 (2010). 
 
To date, the Supreme Court has 
incorporated most of the first eight 
amendments—with a few notable 
exceptions: the Third Amendment’s 
protection against quartering soldiers, the 
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Fifth Amendment’s grand-jury requirement, 
and the Seventh Amendment’s right to a civil 
jury trial. Id. at 765 n.13 (citations omitted). 
At issue here is whether the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is 
enforceable against the States. We hold it is 
not. 
 
 The Eighth Amendment provides: 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. 
amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has never 
held that States are subject to the Excessive 
Fines Clause. The Court initially declined to 
decide the Clause’s incorporation status. 
 
Because of the result we reach today, 
we need not answer several questions 
that otherwise might be necessarily 
antecedent to finding the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines 
Clause applicable to an award of 
punitive damages, … [including] 
whether the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on excessive fines applies 
to the several States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment[.] 
 
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. 
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 
(1989). 
 
A dozen years later, in a case 
involving not a fine but another punitive-
damages award, the Supreme Court stated in 
dictum that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause “makes the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive 
fines and cruel and unusual punishments 
applicable to the States.” Cooper Indus., Inc. 
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 
424, 433- 34 (2001) (citing Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)). 
A prominent treatise on criminal procedure 
observed that Cooper’s statement 
incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause was 
merely dictum. “In noting that the due 
process clause also incorporated the Eighth 
Amendment prohibitions against excessive 
fines and cruel and unusual punishments, the 
Court cited Furman v. Georgia, … which 
involved an application of the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishments.” 
Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 2.6(b), n.45 at 833 (4th ed. 2015). 
 
Despite Cooper’s 2001 dictum that 
the Clause can be enforced against States, the 
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement 
on this subject, in 2010, suggests the Clause 
has not been incorporated after all. 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13. McDonald 
was an incorporation case. At issue was 
whether the Second Amendment’s individual 
right to keep and bear arms, recognized in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008), is enforceable against the States. 
McDonald held that it is—a position 
commanding the support of five Justices, four 
of whom agreed it was enforceable through 
the Due Process Clause. Only Justice Thomas 
believed the basis for decision should be the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805-58 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and in the judgment). En 
route to deciding that the Second 
Amendment applies to the States, McDonald 
observed that “[o]nly a handful of the Bill of 
Rights protections remain unincorporated”, 
id. at 765, and included on that list “the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
excessive fines.” Id. at 765 n.13. Citing only 
Browning-Ferris and not Cooper, the Court 
stated, “We have never decided whether the 
… Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
excessive fines applies to the States through 
the Due Process Clause.” Id. 
 
It is not self-evident why the 
McDonald Court did not mention Cooper. 
Perhaps the omission was an oversight, 
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though we will not conclude lightly that the 
Supreme Court whiffed on the existence or 
meaning of its precedent. The more likely 
explanation is that McDonald was treating 
Cooper’s statement as superfluous to 
Cooper’s holding and therefore dictum. Just 
as Cooper’s statement that the Excessive 
Fines Clause is enforceable against the States 
is dictum, so too is McDonald’s statement 
that the Clause is not. 
 
So where does that leave us? Given 
the lack of clear direction from the Supreme 
Court, we have a couple of options. One 
option is to ignore McDonald and follow the 
lead of some courts that have either applied 
the Excessive Fines Clause to challenged 
state action or assumed without deciding that 
the Clause applies. See, e.g., Hamilton v. City 
of New Albany, Indiana, ___ Fed. Appx. ___, 
2017 WL 2615453, at *5 (7th Cir. Jun. 16, 
2017) (vacating summary judgment for city 
on plaintiff’s federal excessive-fines claim 
and remanding for trial without mentioning 
incorporation or McDonald); Cripps v. 
Louisiana Dep’t of Agriculture and Forestry, 
819 F.3d 221, 234 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(“Assuming arguendo that the Excessive 
Fines Clause applies, the record indicates that 
each of Plaintiffs’ offenses resulted in fines 
that do not exceed the limits prescribed by the 
statute authorizing it.”); Discount Inn, Inc. v. 
City of Chicago, 803 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 
2015) (holding that “the fines imposed by the 
challenged [city] ordinances are not 
excessive even if the ‘excessive fines’ clause 
is applicable”); Public Employee Retirement 
Admin. Comm’n v. Bettencourt, 47 N.E.3d 
667, 672 n.7, 681 (Mass. 2016) (holding 
forfeiture violates federal excessive-fines 
clause based on Cooper without mentioning 
McDonald). 
 
A second option is to await guidance 
from the Supreme Court and decline to find 
or assume incorporation until the Supreme 
Court decides the issue authoritatively. We 
choose this latter, more cautious approach for 
two reasons. First, although the Supreme 
Court has addressed this issue only in dicta, 
its statement in McDonald that the Clause has 
not been incorporated is entitled to more 
weight because it is the Court’s most recent. 
Second, Indiana is a sovereign state within 
our federal system, and we elect not to 
impose federal obligations on the State that 
the federal government itself has not 
mandated. An important corollary is that 
Indiana has its own system of legal, including 
constitutional, protections for its citizens and 
other persons within its jurisdiction. Absent a 
definitive holding from the Supreme Court, 
we decline to subject Indiana to a federal test 
that may operate to impede development of 
our own excessive-fines jurisprudence under 
the Indiana Constitution 
 
Although we ultimately disagree with 
our Court of Appeals’ decision to apply the 
Excessive Fines Clause to the State’s 
forfeiture, we understand the Court’s reason 
for doing so. After all, the State specifically 
advised the Court that it “need not decide [the 
issue of incorporation] … because the 
penalties imposed were not 
unconstitutionally excessive.” Despite the 
State’s choice not to wage the incorporation 
battle here, we need not abide a party’s 
consent to a misstatement or misapplication 
of law. Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 
1030 (Ind. 2007). We reserve to ourselves—
not the parties—the prerogative to pronounce 
what law governs a particular dispute. The 
parties’ consensus here to subject the State’s 
forfeiture to review under the Clause does not 
require that we follow suit. And we decline to 
do so, mindful that our colleagues on the 
Court of Appeals and the trial court may be 
correct in foretelling where the Supreme 
Court will one day lead on whether to apply 
the Clause to the States. 
 
 97 
To be clear, our decision on 
incorporation should not be read to prejudge 
the merits of pending or prospective 
forfeiture challenges based on other 
provisions of state or federal law. Our narrow 
holding here is confined to the Court of 
Appeals’ reliance on a provision of the 
United States Constitution—the Excessive 
Fines Clause—that the Supreme Court has 
never enforced against the States. We decline 
to address other potential problems with the 
State’s forfeiture because Timbs raised only 
an excessive-fines challenge under federal 
law. 
II. Based on the trial court’s findings, 
the State proved it is entitled to 
forfeit the Land Rover. 
Because we have resolved the Eighth 
Amendment issue against Timbs, we turn to 
whether the State proved its entitlement to 
forfeit the vehicle under Indiana law. The 
governing statute provides, in pertinent part, 
that to obtain forfeiture the State must show 
that a person used the vehicle to transport an 
illicit substance listed in the statute for the 
purpose of dealing or possessing the 
substance. 
 
Sec. 1. (a) The following may be 
seized:  
 
(1) All vehicles … , if they are used 
… by the person … in possession of 
them to transport … the following:  
 
(A) A controlled substance for 
the purpose of committing 
… any of the following:  
 
(i) Dealing in or 
manufacturing 
cocaine or a narcotic 
drug (IC 35-48-4- 1) 
 
 ***  
 
(iii)  Dealing in a schedule 
I, II, or III controlled 
substance (IC 35-48-
4-2)  
 
***  
(vii) Possession of cocaine 
or a narcotic drug (IC 
35-48-4-6) 
 
I.C. § 34-24-1-1 (Supp. 2012). See also 
Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind. 
1995). 
 
After a bench trial, the trial court 
made the following factual findings 
relevant here.  
 
Between the date of purchase, and 
May 31st, 2013, [Timbs] drove the 
vehicle frequently from Marion to 
Richmond to purchase heroin. The 
Land Rover was used by [Timbs] to 
transport heroin back to Marion. 
[Timbs] both used and sold the 
heroin. When the Land Rover was 
seized by the State at the end of May 
2013, the odometer reading was 
between 17,000 and 18,000 miles. 
The increased mileage primarily 
resulted from [Timbs] traveling 
between Marion and Richmond to 
engage in illegal drug trafficking. 
 
 98 
On appeal, Timbs challenges these findings 
under the corpus-delicti rule, which requires 
independent evidence of a crime beyond the 
defendant’s confession. But the rule applies 
only to an out-of-court confession in a 
criminal proceeding and thus does not benefit 
Timbs. See Willoughby v. State, 552 N.E.2d 
462, 466 (Ind. 1990). Timbs’s inculpatory 
testimony occurred in court, while his 
counsel was present, in this civil-forfeiture 
proceeding, where he admitted to multiple 
trips to Richmond in the Land Rover to 
acquire heroin and transport it back to 
Marion. Because corpus delicti is no obstacle 
to the use of Timbs’s testimony, the court’s 
findings are supported by the evidence, and 
the State proved them by the required 
preponderance of the evidence, I.C. § 34-24-
1-4(a). These findings establish each of the 
statutory elements recited above to prove the 
State’s entitlement to forfeit the Land 
Rover—namely, that Timbs used the vehicle 
to transport and possess heroin, a schedule I 
controlled substance, id. § 35-48-2-4(c) 
(Supp. 2013), and a narcotic drug, id. §§ 35-
48-2-4(c), 35-48-1-20(1) (2008 Repl.), for 
the purpose of engaging in illegal drug 
trafficking 
 
Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, we reverse the trial 
court’s judgment for Timbs and remand with 
instructions to enter judgment for the State on 
its forfeiture complaint 
 
 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., 
concur. 
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“Supreme Court Will Decide If Civil Forfeiture is Unconstitutional, Violates The 
Eighth Amendment”  
 
 
Forbes 
Nick Sibilla 
June 19, 2018 
 
For the first time in over 20 years, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will have the opportunity 
to review the constitutionality of civil 
forfeiture laws, which allow the government 
to confiscate cash, cars, and even homes. On 
Monday, the court granted a cert petition 
from Tyson Timbs, who was forced to forfeit 
his $40,000 Land Rover in civil court to the 
State of Indiana, after he pled guilty to selling 
less than $200 worth of drugs. 
Like too many Americans, Tyson was 
addicted to opioids, at first taking 
prescription painkillers before switching to 
heroin. When Tyson tried to sell undercover 
officers four grams of heroin, he was arrested 
in 2013. As punishment, Tyson agreed to 
serve one year of house arrest and pay $1,200 
in court fees. But the state also wanted his 
Land Rover, which Tyson had bought with 
life-insurance proceeds after his father died. 
Determined to keep his truck, Tyson argued 
that forfeiting the Land Rover would violate 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “excessive 
fines.” A trial judge agreed and rejected the 
forfeiture as “grossly disproportional.” Under 
Indiana law, a felony conviction could trigger 
a maximum fine of $10,000—less than a 
quarter of what Tyson’s Land Rover was 
worth. That decision was upheld by an 
appellate court. 
But in November, the Indiana Supreme 
Court reversed that decision, and instead 
ruled that the Constitution’s Excessive Fines 
Clause provided no protection to Hoosiers. 
“The Excessive Fines Clause does not bar the 
State from forfeiting Defendant’s vehicle,” 
the court ruled, “because the United States 
Supreme Court has not held that the Clause 
applies to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” 
After the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified, most of the protections guaranteed 
by the Bill of Rights were steadily 
“incorporated” against the states, including 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “excessive 
bail” and “cruel and unusual punishment.” 
With this decision, the Indiana Supreme 
Court found itself at odds with 14 other state 
high courts and two federal appellate circuit 
courts, which had all ruled that the Excessive 
Fines Clause does, in fact, apply to the states. 
Deprived of both his constitutional rights and 
his truck, it’s been hard to “keep my life on 
track,” Tyson said. “Without my car, it is 
incredibly difficult to do all the things the 
government wants me to do to stay clean, like 
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visit my probation officer, go to AA, and 
keep my job,” he noted. “Fighting to stay 
clean is hard enough. I’ve served out my 
punishment, but now the government is going 
beyond seeking justice. Forfeiture only 
makes it more challenging for people in my 
position to clean up and become contributing 
members of society.” 
In January, Tyson and the Institute for 
Justice, a public interest law firm, filed a cert 
petition urging the U.S. Supreme Court to 
take the case and overturn the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s ruling. Their efforts earned 
support from all across the political spectrum, 
with the Southern Poverty Law Center, the 
Cato Institute, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, and the National Association for 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, all filing briefs in 
support of Tyson and IJ’s petition. 
With the petition now granted, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will decide once and for all 
“whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive 
Fines Clause is incorporated against the 
States under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
“This case is about more than just a truck,” 
said Wesley Hottot, an attorney with the 
Institute for Justice. “The Excessive Fines 
Clause is a critical check on the government’s 
power to punish people and take their 
property. Without it, state and local law 
enforcement could confiscate everything a 
person owns based on a minor crime or—
using civil forfeiture—no crime at all.” 
Once a legal backwater limited to piracy and 
customs cases, civil forfeiture has 
robbed tens of thousands of innocent 
Americans. Meaningful safeguards are few 
and far between. Today, just three states have 
abolished civil forfeiture, while only 15 
states generally require a criminal conviction 
to forfeit property. Incredibly, in more than 
40 states, once property has been forfeited, 
police and prosecutors can take a cut of the 
proceeds. 
A report by the Institute for Justice found that 
annual forfeiture revenue doubled across 14 
states between 2002 and 2013, netting law 
enforcement hundreds of millions of dollars. 
But those programs are utterly dwarfed by the 
federal government’s confiscations. From 
2001 to 2014, the Justice Department and the 
Treasury Department’s forfeiture funds took 
in almost $29 billion. 
“This direct financial incentive gives the 
government a perverse incentive to abuse this 
power, which is exactly what is happening in 
Tyson’s case with this excessive fine,” said IJ 
Attorney Sam Gedge. “Unless we have 
federal protections against excessive fines, 
no one’s property is safe.” 
Timbs v. Indiana should be the biggest civil 
forfeiture case heard by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in at least two decades. Although the 
court had gone quiet on the issue for years, a 
recent string of opinions seem to indicate that 
many justices want to police this police 
power. 
Last year, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a 
scathing concurrence against civil forfeiture 
when the Supreme Court declined to hear the 
case of Lisa Olivia Leonard, who had over 
$200,000 in cash confiscated from a traffic 
stop in Texas. “This system,” Thomas wrote, 
“where police can seize property with limited 
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judicial oversight and retain it for their own 
use— has led to egregious and well-
chronicled abuses.” 
Thomas further criticized how “forfeiture 
operations frequently target the poor and 
other groups least able to defend their 
interests in forfeiture proceedings,” who in 
turn are “more likely to suffer in their daily 
lives while they litigate for the return of a 
critical item of property, such as a car or a 
home.” 
Later that year, the Supreme Court struck 
down a Colorado law that bore a striking 
resemblance to civil forfeiture. Under the 
state’s Exoneration Act, criminal defendants 
whose convictions had been overturned were 
forced to prove their innocence in civil court 
before they could recover any court costs, 
fees or restitution they paid. Writing for the 
majority in Nelson v. Colorado, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg ruled that “Colorado may not 
presume a person, adjudged guilty of no 
crime, nonetheless guilty enough for 
monetary exactions.” 
And in April, Justice Neil Gorsuch called out 
civil forfeiture when he joined the majority 
n Sessions v. Dimaya, which ruled against the 
Justice Department for relying on an 
“unconstitutionally vague” deportation law. 
Deportation is a civil, not criminal, 
proceeding, but because it is “a particularly 
severe penalty,” the Supreme Court held that 
deportation should be scrutinized under a 
more stringent standard of review. 
Gorsuch, however, rejected the notion that 
deportation should be singled out for special 
treatment apart from other civil proceedings. 
Writing in a separate concurrence, he asked, 
“Why, for example, would due process 
require Congress to speak more clearly when 
it seeks to deport a lawfully resident alien 
than when it wishes to subject a citizen to 
indefinite civil commitment, strip him of a 
business license essential to his family’s 
living, or confiscate his home?” 
“If the severity of the consequences counts 
when deciding the standard of review,” he 
wrote, “shouldn’t we also take account of the 
fact that today’s civil laws regularly impose 
penalties far more severe than those found in 
many criminal statutes?” 
Today’s “civil” penalties include 
confiscatory rather than compensatory fines, 
forfeiture provisions that allow homes to be 
taken, remedies that strip persons of their 
professional licenses and livelihoods, and the 
power to commit persons against their will 
indefinitely. Some of these penalties are 
routinely imposed and are routinely graver 
than those associated with misdemeanor 
crimes— and often harsher than the 
punishment for felonies. And not only are 
“punitive civil sanctions...rapidly 
expanding,” they are “sometimes more 
severely punitive than the parallel criminal 
sanctions for the same conduct.” 
With Timbs v. Indiana, the Supreme Court 
has a new opportunity to roll back unduly 
harsh civil penalties. A victory for Tyson 
would vindicate the constitutional rights of 
all Americans from the government’s 
grasping hand. 
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“He Sold Drugs for $225. Indiana Took His $42,000 Land Rover” 
 
The New York Times 
 
Adam Liptak 
June 25, 2018 
 
Tyson Timbs would like his Land Rover 
back. 
The State of Indiana took it, using a law that 
lets it seize vehicles used to transport illegal 
drugs. Last week, the Supreme Court agreed 
to decide whether the Constitution has 
anything to say about such civil forfeiture 
laws, which allow states and localities to take 
and keep private property used to commit 
crimes. 
Mr. Timbs bought the Land Rover after his 
father died. The life insurance money 
amounted to around $73,000, and he spent 
$42,000 of it on the vehicle. He blew most of 
the rest on drugs. 
“Unfortunately, I had a whole bunch of 
money, which isn’t a good idea for a drug 
addict to have,” Mr. Timbs recalled the other 
day. “I used a lot, and eventually the money 
ran out. It was an addict’s life.” 
Mr. Timbs’s habit started with an opioid 
addiction and progressed to heroin. He used 
his Land Rover to get drugs and, on at least 
two occasions, to sell them. The buyers were 
undercover police officers. 
Mr. Timbs pleaded guilty to one of the drug 
sales, in which $225 had changed hands, and 
he was sentenced to a year of house arrest 
followed by five years of probation. He also 
agreed to pay an array of fees and fines 
adding up to about $1,200. 
But Indiana wanted more. Using the civil 
forfeiture law, it took the Land Rover. 
Mr. Timbs, 37, has put his life back together, 
but it has not been easy. “I have to go to 
meetings, to counseling, to probation 
appointments,” he said, making clear that he 
was not complaining. 
“They want you to get a job,” he said. “It’s 
hard to do without a vehicle. Plus, I was a 
felon, which makes it even harder to find a 
job.” 
He found work as a machinist in a factory 
some 40 minutes from his home in Marion, 
Ind., where he lives with his aunt. He borrows 
her car to get to work, and he feels guilty 
about that. 
“She has to take a bus back and forth to her 
kidney dialysis appointments,” he said. 
As Justice Clarence Thomas explained last 
year in an opinion urging the Supreme Court 
to examine civil forfeiture laws, government 
seizures of property used to commit crimes 
have become worrisomely popular. 
“Forfeiture has in recent decades become 
widespread and highly profitable,” Justice 
Thomas wrote. “And because the law 
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enforcement entity responsible for seizing the 
property often keeps it, these entities have 
strong incentives to pursue forfeiture.” 
“This system — where police can seize 
property with limited judicial oversight and 
retain it for their own use — has led to 
egregious and well-chronicled abuses,” he 
wrote, citing excellent reporting from The 
Washington Post and The New Yorker. 
The burdens of civil forfeiture fall 
disproportionately on the poor, said Wesley 
P. Hottot, a lawyer with the Institute for 
Justice, which represents Mr. Timbs. 
“Tyson’s case illustrates how civil forfeiture 
makes it harder for people who have made 
mistakes to correct those mistakes and re-
enter society,” Mr. Hottot said. “It shouldn’t 
take the United States Supreme Court to 
make clear that you don’t take everything 
from a person who’s facing the kinds of 
challenges Tyson is.” 
Mr. Timbs won the early rounds in Indiana’s 
lawsuit seeking to take his vehicle, based on 
the Eighth Amendment, which says that 
“excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.” 
Judge Jeffrey D. Todd, of the Grant County 
Superior Court, said the amendment’s second 
clause — the one barring “excessive fines” 
— protected Mr. Timbs. The Land Rover, the 
judge wrote, was worth about four times the 
maximum fine Mr. Timbs could have been 
ordered to pay, which was $10,000. It was 
also worth more than 30 times the fines that 
were actually imposed. 
“The amount of the forfeiture sought is 
excessive and is grossly disproportional to 
the gravity of the defendant’s offense,” Judge 
Todd wrote. 
An appeals court agreed. In dissent, Judge 
Michael P. Barnes wrote that civil forfeiture 
laws can be abused but that Mr. Timbs should 
lose the vehicle. 
“I am keenly aware of the overreach some 
law enforcement agencies have exercised in 
some of these cases,” Judge Barnes wrote. 
“Entire family farms are sometimes forfeited 
based on one family member’s conduct, or 
exorbitant amounts of money are seized. 
However, it seems to me that one who deals 
heroin, and there is no doubt from the record 
we are talking about a dealer, must and 
should suffer the legal consequences to 
which he exposes himself.” 
The Indiana Supreme Court ruled against Mr. 
Timbs, on interesting grounds. It said the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
excessive fines did not apply to ones imposed 
by states. 
This is, surprisingly, an open question. The 
Bill of Rights originally restricted the power 
of only the federal government, but the 
Supreme Court has ruled that most of its 
protections apply to the states under the due 
process clause of the 14th Amendment, one 
of the post-Civil War amendments. 
But there are a few exceptions, and the 
Supreme Court has been inconsistent about 
where it stands on the excessive fines clause. 
Mr. Timbs’s case is poised to resolve the 
question. It will be argued in the fall. 
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In the meantime, Mr. Timbs sometimes 
lapses into frustration and bitterness. 
“I don’t deserve this,” he said. “Nobody does. 
It’s an unnecessary stressor. I struggle with 
more than addiction. I struggle with anxiety 
and depression. I don’t feel like much of a 
man, because I don’t have a vehicle.” 
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 “Keeping Cops’ Hands Out of Your Pockets” 
 
The American Conservative 
 
Brian Saady 
July 16, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to 
rule on a case that could have a major impact 
on civil liberties and whether civil asset 
forfeiture can continue to serve as low 
hanging fruit for bureaucratic interests run 
amok.  
Timbs v. Indiana involves a man whose 
$42,000 Land Rover was confiscated via civil 
asset forfeiture. Attorneys from the 
libertarian public-interest law firm, Institute 
for Justice, don’t deny their client Tyson 
Timbs was convicted of selling $385 worth 
of heroin in two transactions and that his 
vehicle was used in the sale.  
What they do contest is that the confiscation 
of the Land Rover (purchased with a payment 
from a life insurance policy, not drug money) 
was unconstitutional under the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the 8th Amendment.  
How is that? Due to a plea bargain, Timbs 
was sentenced to one year of house arrest and 
five years of probation. He was also assessed 
a total of $1,200 in fees and fines. The 
offense carries a maximum fine of $10,000. 
Hence, Timbs’ attorneys assert the 
confiscation of a $42,000 car exceeds what he 
was liable for in the first place. 
The Indiana Supreme Court didn’t rule 
whether the forfeiture was excessive. Instead, 
it ruled that the state wasn’t subject to the 
Excessive Fines Clause, and that it is a matter 
for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine. 
Fourteen other states already adhere to the 
Excessive Fines Clause, but Indiana and three 
others do not, according to the ABA Journal. 
Virtually every civil rights organization 
supports Timbs on the merits of this case. 
Furthermore, there are historic undertones 
that prompted the Constitutional 
Accountability Center to file a friend-of-the-
court brief requesting that U.S. Supreme 
Court hear this case. 
That organization points to the early Jim 
Crow era in which black men were often 
victims of police persecution and assessed 
excessive fines for petty offenses. According 
to Douglas A. Blackmon’s book, Slavery by 
Another Name, as many as 200,000 black 
men were forced into debt peonage in the 
post-Civil War era.     
The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on 
the Excessive Fines Clause. With that said, if 
it rules in favor of Timbs, such a decision will 
not fully overturn the practice of civil asset 
forfeiture. However, it could rein in one 
major aspect of its abuses. 
This unjust practice has gradually become a 
standardized tool of the law enforcement 
community. Remarkably, federal 
agencies seized over $5 billion in 2014, 
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which was more than the amount of property 
burglarized that same year, $3.9 billion. 
Suffice it to say, civil asset forfeiture is 
padding municipal budgets. One of the more 
glaring examples of this self-serving dynamic 
came from a seminar led by Harry S. 
Connelly Jr., a city attorney for Las Cruces, 
New Mexico. His zealous support for civil 
asset forfeiture made it clear that law 
enforcement is often more focused upon 
raising revenue, rather than public safety. 
In particular, Connelly lauded a scenario in 
which parents lost their $300,000 house after 
their son was caught selling $10 of marijuana 
outside of their home.“Just think what you 
could do as a legal department. We could be 
czars. We could own the city. We could be in 
the real estate business,” said Connelly. 
Media attention generally focuses on 
draconian cases involving high-dollar 
figures, cars, or homes that were confiscated 
by the government. However, one of the 
more perverse aspects of civil asset forfeiture 
is the manner in which much smaller amounts 
of money are routinely confiscated by police. 
To be exact, the median forfeiture in Chicago 
was $1,049, according to a study by Reason 
Magazine and the Lucy Parsons Lab. That’s 
particularly disturbing because it generally 
costs at least $2,000 in legal and court fees to 
recover your assets. In other words, even if 
you’re willing to climb through a pile of red 
tape, it’s pointless to recover your assets in 
most cases.   
Moreover, unlike Timbs v. Indiana, the vast 
majority of civil asset forfeiture cases don’t 
involve a corresponding criminal case. In 
fact, eighty-seven percent of federal 
forfeitures are civil, not criminal. 
The reason is that the government has to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
criminal case. On the other hand, the 
presumption of innocence doesn’t exist in a 
civil asset forfeiture case. 
The defendant is technically the property that 
was seized. The owner must prove in court, 
with a preponderance of evidence, that the 
property wasn’t used to commit a crime or 
derived from criminal activity. 
This is an un-American and 
counterproductive practice that is 
fundamentally opposed to constitutional 
principles. For this, among other reasons, are 
why 84 percent of Americans oppose civil 
asset forfeiture.   
This is such an egregious issue that it 
motivated the generally reticent Justice 
Clarence Thomas to comment on Leonard v 
Texas. In that case, the police confiscated 
$201,100 in cash during a traffic stop. The 
money, along with the bill of sale for a 
Pennsylvania home, was located in a safe 
inside the trunk of the car. 
Thomas pointed to wide misconduct 
associated with civil forfeitures. He even 
cited a few news reports and a research paper 
by the Institute for Justice, Policing for 
Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture. 
However, Thomas reluctantly ruled that the 
court couldn’t hear the case because those 
issues weren’t addressed at the lower court 
level first. 
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Nonetheless, Thomas clearly expressed 
interest in ruling on this issue with future 
cases. 
“(I)t is unclear whether courts historically 
permitted forfeiture actions to proceed civilly 
in all respects. Some of this Court’s early 
cases suggested that forfeiture actions were 
in the nature of criminal proceedings. 
Whether forfeiture is characterized as civil or 
criminal carries important implications for a 
variety of procedural protections, including 
the right to a jury trial and the proper standard 
of proof.” 
With that in mind, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s eventual replacement looms large 
in the case of Timbs v. Indiana, which will be 
heard in the next session of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Kennedy often ruled in favor of civil 
rights issues. 
To reiterate, the Supreme Court can’t 
overturn all of the wrongs associated with 
civil asset forfeiture in this one case. 
However, a favorable ruling in Timbs v. 
Indiana would certainly curtail some of the 
most flagrant abuses. Furthermore, it could 
lead to future cases that finally terminate this 
unjust and unconstitutional practice.   
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“Supreme Court affirms Land Rover forfeiture in drug case” 
 
 
The Indiana Lawyer 
 
Olivia Covington 
November 2, 2017 
 
The state of Indiana can move forward with 
its plan to seize a Land Rover worth more 
than $40,000 from a convicted heroin dealer 
after the Indiana Supreme Court ruled the 
Eighth Amendment does not bar the state 
from making such a forfeiture. 
The justices handed down that decision 
Thursday in State of Indiana v. Tyson Timbs, 
27S04-1702-MI-70. That case began in 
January 2013, when Tyson Timbs used his 
father’s life insurance proceeds to purchase a 
Land Rover for roughly $42,000. 
Timbs then used the Land Rover to buy and 
transport heroin throughout Marion until he 
was arrested as part of a series of controlled 
buys. The Land Rover had 1,237 miles on its 
odometer when Timbs purchased it, but by 
the time police seized it in May 2013, it had 
more than 17,000 miles. 
In 2015, Timbs pleaded guilty to Class B 
felony dealing and Class D felony conspiracy 
to commit theft in exchange for the state 
dismissing a third charge against him. The 
Grant Superior Court sentenced Timbs to six 
years, with one year executed, while he 
agreed to pay $1,203 in fees and costs. 
The state also moved to seize the Land Rover 
through civil forfeiture, but the trial court 
denied that action, finding the forfeiture 
would be an excessive fine under the Eighth 
Amendment. The court noted that the 
maximum fine for Timbs’ Class B felony was 
$10,000, but the vehicle was worth roughly 
four times that amount. 
A divided panel of the Indiana Court of 
Appeals upheld that decision in October 
2016, with Judge Michael Barnes dissenting. 
But after hearing oral arguments in March, 
the Supreme Court upheld the state’s 
forfeiture action. 
Justice Geoffrey Slaughter, who wrote for the 
unanimous panel of justices, first wrote in his 
Thursday opinion that the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause has 
not been applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme 
Court noted in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761-63 (2010) that 
the excessive fines clause has not been 
incorporated to the states, and Slaughter 
wrote the Indiana high court declined to 
“subject Indiana to a federal test that may 
operate to impede development of our own 
excessive-fines jurisprudence under the 
Indiana Constitution.” 
“To be clear, our decision on incorporation 
should not be read to prejudge the merits of 
pending or prospective forfeiture challenges 
based on other provisions of state or federal 
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law,” Slaughter continued. “Our narrow 
holding here is confined to the Court of 
Appeals’ reliance on a provision of the 
United States Constitution – the Excessive 
Fines Clause – that the Supreme Court has 
never enforced against the States.” 
Slaughter then went on to write the state 
proved it was entitled to forfeit the Land 
Rover under the statutory provisions in 
Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-1 (Supp. 
2012) by proving that Timbs used the vehicle 
to transport and possess heroin to engage in 
illegal trafficking. Thus, the trial court’s 
decision was reversed, and the case was 
remanded to enter judgment for the state on 
its forfeiture complaint. 
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Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania  
 
Ruling Below: Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3rd Cir. 2017) 
 
Overview: The Court has previously ruled that in order for a property owner to file a lawsuit in 
federal court, an owner must pursue all available state-court remedies. Rose Mary Knick owns 90 
acres of land in rural Pennsylvania. In 2012 the town where Knick’s property is located passed an 
ordinance that requires all owners of cemeteries to provide public access to those sites during 
daylight hours through a right of way from the nearest road. Knick has a private cemetery on her 
land and the town claims the ordinance still applies. Knick went first to state court to challenge the 
ordinance, but the Pennsylvania court declined to rule on her lawsuit because the town had 
withdrawn its notice of violation and agreed not to enforce the law against Knick. When Knick 
went to federal court, the district court dismissed her claims on the ground that Knick had not 
exhausted her state court options.  
 
Issue: (1) Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider the portion of Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank that requires property owners to exhaust state 
court remedies to ripen federal takings claims; and (2) whether Williamson County’s ripeness 
doctrine bars review of takings claims that assert that a law causes an unconstitutional taking on 
its face, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 6th, 9th and 10th Circuits hold, or whether facial 
claims are exempt from Williamson County, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 4th and 7th 
Circuits hold. 
Rose Mary KNICK, Appellant 
v. 
TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT; Carl S. Ferraro, Individual and in his Official Capacity as Scott 
Township Code Enforcement Officer  
 
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit 
 
Decided on July 6, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
SMITH, Chief Judge:  
 
On December 20, 2012, the Township 
of Scott in Lackawanna County, 
Pennsylvania enacted an ordinance 
regulating cemeteries. The ordinance 
authorizes officials to enter upon any 
property within the Township to determine 
the existence and location of any cemetery. 
The ordinance also compels property owners 
to hold their private cemeteries open to the 
public during daylight hours. The plaintiff, 
Rose Mary Knick, challenges the ordinance 
on two grounds. First, Knick argues that the 
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ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of 
private property in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Second, Knick argues that the 
ordinance takes private property without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
The Township’s ordinance is 
extraordinary and constitutionally suspect. 
However, important justiciability 
considerations preclude us from reaching the 
merits. Because Knick concedes that her 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated 
and fails to demonstrate that they imminently 
will be, Knick lacks standing to advance her 
Fourth Amendment challenge. And as the 
District Court correctly held, Knick’s Fifth 
Amendment claims are not ripe until she has 
sought and been denied just compensation 
using Pennsylvania’s inversecondemnation 
procedures, as required by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton 
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
We will therefore affirm. 
 
I 
 
On December 20, 2012, the Township 
of Scott enacted Ordinance No. 12-12-20-
001, titled “Ordinance of the Township of 
Scott Township [sic], Lackawanna County, 
Pennsylvania, Relating to the Operation and 
Maintenance of Cemeteries and Burial 
Places” (hereinafter, the “Ordinance”). App. 
82. The Ordinance applies to “[a]ll 
cemeteries, whether private or public, and 
whether existing or established prior to the 
date of this Ordinance or hereafter created.” 
Id. It requires cemetery owners to “properly 
maintain and upkeep any cemetery.” App. 83. 
 
Critical to this case are two provisions 
of the Ordinance. First, it requires that “[a]ll 
cemeteries within the Township shall be kept 
open and accessible to the general public 
during daylight hours. No owner . . . shall 
unreasonably restrict access to the general 
public nor shall any fee for access be 
charged.” Id. We will refer to this as the 
“public-access provision.”  
 
Second, the Ordinance permits the 
Township’s “Code Enforcement Officer 
and/or his/her agents and representatives [to] 
enter upon any property within the Township 
for the purposes of determining the existence 
of and location of any cemetery, in order to 
ensure compliance with the terms and 
provisions of this Ordinance.” Id. We will 
refer to this as the “inspection provision.” 
 
Anyone who violates the Ordinance is 
subject to a fine of between $300 and $600, 
and “[e]ach day that the violation exists shall 
constitute a separate offense.” Id.  
 
On April 10, 2013, the Township 
Code Enforcement Officer, Carl S. Ferraro, 
entered Knick’s property without an 
administrative warrant. Ferraro identified 
certain stones on Knick’s property as grave 
markers and issued a Notice of Violation 
dated April 11, 2013. Knick disputes that a 
cemetery exists on her property 
 
On May 7, 2013, Knick brought suit 
against the Township in the Lackawanna 
County Court of Common Pleas seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Knick filed 
an Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief 
on or about that same date. The parties 
stipulated that the Township would withdraw 
its Notice of Violation and further stipulated 
to an order staying any enforcement actions 
against Knick. A hearing was held on 
October 8, 2014. Then, on October 21, the 
Court ruled that it “will render no decision on 
the matter.” App. 261. Specifically, the Court 
ruled “that it is not the proper venue for this 
matter, since the case is not in the proper 
posture for a decision to be rendered on the 
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Plaintiff’s requested forms of relief.” Id. 
Then, on October 31, the Township issued 
another Notice of Violation. Knick filed a 
Petition for Contempt of Court in the 
Lackawanna County Court of Common 
Pleas, which the Court denied on January 30, 
2015. At no point did Knick institute an 
inverse-condemnation proceeding against the 
Township. See 26 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 
502(c). 
 
Knick filed this action on November 
20, 2014 in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In 
her original Complaint, Knick asserted four 
Counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (I) Fourth 
Amendment claims against the Township for 
maintaining a warrantless inspection regime 
(the facial challenge) and entering Knick’s 
property without a warrant (the as-applied 
challenge); (II) a Fourth Amendment claim 
against the Township for failure to train its 
officials to obtain administrative warrants; 
(III) Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims against Ferraro in his official capacity 
for entering Knick’s property without a 
warrant; and (IV) claims seeking invalidation 
of the Ordinance on Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, including, 
inter alia, vagueness, improper exercise of 
the Township’s police power, and taking 
private property without just compensation. 
After the Township filed its motion to 
dismiss, Knick filed an Amended Complaint, 
which added Count V for declaratory and 
injunctive relief. By Order dated October 28, 
2015, the District Court dismissed Counts I–
III with prejudice and dismissed Counts IV 
and V without prejudice. 
 
Knick filed a Second Amended 
Complaint on November 16, 2015. The 
Second Amended Complaint asserts three 
Counts: (I) the Fourth Amendment claims 
pled in Count I of the original complaint; (II) 
a claim that the Ordinance takes Knick’s 
private property without just compensation, 
in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments; and (III) claims for 
declaratory and injunctive relief because, 
inter alia, the Ordinance unconstitutionally 
takes Knick’s property and authorizes 
unconstitutional searches. By Order dated 
September 7, 2016, the District Court 
dismissed Count I with prejudice for the 
reasons provided in its earlier decision and 
dismissed Counts II and III without prejudice 
pending exhaustion of state-law remedies. 
 
This appeal timely followed. On 
appeal, Knick argues that the District Court 
erred by dismissing her Fourth Amendment 
facial challenge and by requiring her to 
exhaust state-law remedies for her takings 
claims. 
 
II 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 
jurisdiction to review “final decisions of the 
district courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 
must assure ourselves of our jurisdiction sua 
sponte, see, e.g., Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. 
v. Glickman, 190 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 
1999). Although the District Court dismissed 
Knick’s Second Amended Complaint 
without prejudice as to certain claims, we 
conclude that Knick nonetheless appealed 
from a final decision. 
 
A final, appealable decision is one 
“by which a district court disassociates itself 
from a case.” Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 
135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015) (quoting Swint v. 
Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 
(1995)). “While decisions of the Court have 
accorded § 1291 a practical rather than a 
technical construction, the statute’s core 
application is to rulings that terminate an 
action.” Id. (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). For that reason, dismissals 
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without prejudice are ordinarily not final; 
leave to amend contemplates “further 
proceedings in the district court as part of the 
same action.” Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 
165 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Aluminum Co. of 
Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 560 (3d 
Cir. 1997)). 
 
But “[e]ven dismissals without 
prejudice have been held to be final and 
appealable if they end [ ][the] suit so far as 
the District Court was concerned.” Id. 
(alterations in original) (quoting GFL 
Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 
189, 198 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also United 
States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 
793, 794 n.1 (1949). For example, we will 
review a dismissal without prejudice if a 
plaintiff stands on the complaint rather than 
exercising leave to amend, Palakovic v. 
Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219 (3d Cir. 2017), if a 
plaintiff argues that administrative 
exhaustion would be futile, Ghana v. 
Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 180–81 (3d Cir. 
2000), or if a plaintiff’s claims are 
“effectively barred” from being subsequently 
reasserted due to the running of a statute of 
limitations or some similar obstacle, LNC 
Invs., LLC v. Republic Nicar., 396 F.3d 342, 
346 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
Here, the District Court dismissed 
Knick’s takings claim without prejudice and 
directed her to exhaust state remedies. The 
District Court did not retain jurisdiction and 
closed the case. Its order further specified 
that, following the conclusion of state 
proceedings, any remaining takings claims 
must be “re-fil[ed] . . . in federal court.” App. 
57. As such, “there cannot be—and, by court 
order, there will not be—any further 
proceedings in the district court as part of the 
same action.” Beazer E., 124 F.3d at 560. 
“[T]he district court has divested itself of 
[the] case entirely, regardless of the fact that 
claims in the case may continue to go forward 
in state court.” Erie Cty. Retirees Ass’n v. 
Cty. of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 
2000). The decision in this case is therefore 
final “even if a similar case may be filed in 
the future because the dismissal was without 
prejudice.” Schering-Plough Healthcare 
Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 
F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2009); see also 
Limnia, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 857 
F.3d 379, 385–86 (D.C. Cir. 2017); 
Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 403(b) DC 
Plan, 851 F.3d 552, 557–58 (6th Cir. 2017); 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d 
215, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] dismissal 
without prejudice, absent some retention of 
jurisdiction, is a final decision . . . .”); cf. 
Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 
602 (3d Cir. 2002) (dismissal without 
prejudice in favor of arbitration is appealable 
where the District Court did not retain 
jurisdiction, even though further court 
proceedings may ensue following 
arbitration). 
 
Thus, we are satisfied that the District 
Court’s decision is a “final” one, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under § 1291. We 
proceed to Knick’s claims. 
 
III 
 We begin with Knick’s facial Fourth 
Amendment challenge. We conclude that she 
lacks Article III standing because she has 
failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and 
redressability. 
 
A 
 
 The Second Amended Complaint 
asserts both facial and as-applied challenges 
to the Ordinance under the Fourth 
Amendment. As part of her as-applied 
challenge, Knick claimed to be injured by an 
unlawful search of her property. But the 
District Court ruled that the search in 
question was lawful, and Knick does not 
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appeal that ruling. Although not initially 
raised by the parties, the question before us is 
whether Knick may persist in her facial 
Fourth Amendment challenge even though 
her own rights were not violated. Following 
supplemental briefing and oral argument by 
the parties, we conclude that Knick has failed 
to carry her burden to demonstrate Article III 
standing to challenge the Ordinance on 
Fourth Amendment grounds. 
 
“[T]he irreducible constitutional 
minimum of standing contains three 
elements”: injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560– 61 (1992). As “[t]he party 
invoking federal jurisdiction,” Knick “bears 
the burden of establishing these elements.” 
Id. at 561. “Plaintiffs must have standing at 
all stages of the litigation,” and certain 
findings by a district court may require a 
subsequent reevaluation of standing. Pub. 
Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. 
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The first element, injury in fact, “is 
often determinative.” Toll Bros. v. Twp. of 
Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 
2009). The plaintiff must demonstrate “an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which 
is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 
(citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). To be concrete, an injury need not 
be “tangible,” but “it must actually exist.” 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 
1548–49 (2016). “For an injury to be 
‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in 
a personal and individual way.’” Id. at 1548 
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). 
Generalized grievances will not suffice. See 
Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 
336, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing 
between generalized and widely shared 
grievances). Furthermore, “[a]lthough 
imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic 
concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its 
purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged 
injury is not too speculative for Article III 
purposes—that the injury is certainly 
impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 564 n.2). If the injury is sufficient 
under those standards, it must also be “fairly 
traceable to the challenged action[] and 
redressable by a favorable ruling” in 
accordance with the remaining two elements 
of standing. Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 
(2010)). 
 
In this case, the District Court ruled 
that the search of Knick’s property complied 
with the Fourth Amendment because Ferraro 
searched an open field. “[A]n open field, 
unlike the curtilage of a home, is not one of 
those protected areas enumerated in the 
Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (citation omitted) 
(citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
176–77 (1984)). Because Knick does not 
challenge that ruling on appeal, she has 
accepted the District Court’s conclusion that 
her Fourth Amendment rights were not 
violated. She has likewise accepted that her 
property was not even “searched” in the 
constitutional sense. Id. at 411 n.8. Even if 
Township officials were likely to return to the 
same part of Knick’s property for further 
inspections, those would also be open-field 
searches not subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection. As discussed below, nothing in 
the record suggests that any future 
inspections would invade her home’s 
curtilage. 
 
As a result, any “injury” arising from 
open-field searches would not be legally 
protected. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. 
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000) 
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(“The interest must consist of obtaining 
compensation for, or preventing, the 
violation of a legally protected right.”). Nor 
would that injury be redressable. If we were 
to enjoin the Ordinance’s inspection 
provision today, the Township would still be 
able to use the open-fields doctrine to enter 
the part of Knick’s property where a 
cemetery was allegedly discovered. Put 
differently, Knick’s situation is one “for 
which [the Ordinance] is irrelevant”; the 
Ordinance does “no work” in authorizing 
searches that would be independently lawful 
under established Fourth Amendment 
doctrines. Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 
2443, 2451 (2015). 
 
Perhaps realizing these deficiencies, 
Knick changed tack in her supplemental 
brief. Now Knick attempts to premise 
standing on the fact that the Ordinance may 
permit the Township to search the curtilage 
of her home—an area of her property that is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. See 
Knick Supp. Br. 3 (“Knick owns property, 
including curtilage, subject to this provision. 
She has alleged the Ordinance authorizes an 
invasion of her property. That is enough for 
standing, particularly at this early stage.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 
There are two problems with this 
theory. First, simply owning property 
protected by the Fourth Amendment 
describes a generalized grievance common to 
all residents of the Township. See Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 575–76. We have recognized standing 
to challenge government search programs 
that are “universal in scope,” but not before 
ensuring that the plaintiffs’ injuries were 
“unmistakably personal.” Schuchardt, 839 
F.3d at 346. Knick has not alleged any 
personal harm arising from a threatened or 
actual curtilage search. Second, Knick cannot 
base standing on a future invasion of her 
home’s curtilage without demonstrating an 
“actual or imminent, not conjectural and 
hypothetical” injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Simply 
owning property subject to a hypothetical 
search is “too speculative for Article III 
purposes.” Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. 
Compare id. at 1148 (holding that plaintiffs 
lacked standing to bring facial Fourth 
Amendment challenge to a statute 
authorizing NSA surveillance because 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a “certainly 
impending” risk that their communications 
would be intercepted), with Free Speech 
Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 825 F.3d 149, 
166–67 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiffs 
demonstrated standing to bring facial Fourth 
Amendment challenge where, inter alia, the 
plaintiffs incurred costs complying with a 
regulation that specifically targeted their type 
of business). 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Knick 
failed to demonstrate a redressable injury-in-
fact and therefore lacks standing. 
 
B 
 
In an attempt to salvage her Fourth 
Amendment claim, Knick argues that she has 
standing to assert a pure facial challenge 
without raising, much less proving, an 
accompanying as-applied challenge. Our 
holding, however, is rooted in time-tested 
principles of justiciability, not in any special 
attribute of facial or as-applied challenges. 
As courts and commentators have 
recognized, those labels often introduce 
confusion, and “the distinction . . . is not so 
well defined that it has some automatic 
effect.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010); see 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial 
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1336 (2000) [hereinafter 
Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges] 
(arguing that facial and as-applied challenges 
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are not “sharply categorically distinct”). 
Nonetheless, there are several points about 
the interaction between those concepts that 
we must clarify. 
 
As a general matter, Knick’s 
argument is correct: there is no requirement 
that a facial challenge be accompanied by an 
as-applied challenge. See, e.g., Patel, 135 S. 
Ct. 2443. Litigants with standing to challenge 
a law have considerable “flexibility . . . to 
shape the issues in litigation.” Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial 
Challenges, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 915, 947 (2011) 
[hereinafter Fallon, Fact and Fiction]. 
Litigants may argue that the law cannot be 
constitutionally applied to them due to some 
particular set of facts or circumstances (an as-
applied challenge), that the law is 
unconstitutional in every application, 
including their own (a facial challenge), or 
both. 
 
However, even if a litigant does not 
allege a violation as applied, the law in 
question must still typically be applied— or 
at least be at risk of imminent application. 
That is because plaintiffs must always 
demonstrate the “irreducible constitutional 
minimum” of Article III standing. Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560. Facial challenges are no 
exception. See Williams v. Lew, 819 F.3d 
466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Furthermore, as a 
prudential matter, a party “must assert his 
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest 
his claim to relief on the legal rights or 
interests of third parties.” Kowalski v. 
Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (quoting 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). 
That prudential rule is relaxed in certain 
doctrinal contexts, most notably in First 
Amendment claims.7 See Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973); 
Osediacz v. City of Cranston, 414 F.3d 136, 
140–41 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Pa. Prison 
Soc’y v. Cortés, 508 F.3d 156, 168–69 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (declining to extend the solicitude 
shown in the “highly exceptional First 
Amendment context” to facial challenges 
raised under the Ex Post Facto and Due 
Process clauses). 
 
Plaintiffs with standing to challenge a 
law may assert solely facial challenges, but in 
doing so they accept a higher substantive 
burden. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
intoned, facial challenges are “the most 
difficult . . . to mount successfully” because 
the challenger “must establish that no set of 
circumstances exist under which the [statute] 
would be valid.” Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2449, 
2450 (alterations in original) (quoting United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 
(1987)).8 The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
discouraged litigants from asserting facial 
challenges—particularly where surveying the 
full range of possible applications is made 
difficult by a barebones record or a need for 
technical expertise. See, e.g., Wash. State 
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 
U.S. 442, 450–51 (2008) (noting that facial 
challenges are disfavored because, in part, 
they “threaten to short circuit the democratic 
process”); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124, 167 (2007) (noting that facial challenges 
to an abortion-related law “should not have 
been entertained in the first instance,” and 
instead should have been presented as 
“preenforcement, as-applied challenges” so 
that the Court could better assess “the nature 
of the medical risk” alleged); Sabri v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 600, 608–10 (2004) (noting 
that “facial challenges are best when 
infrequent” because “they invite judgments 
on fact-poor records” and “depart[] from the 
norms of adjudication in federal courts”). 
 
If a litigant decides to bring both 
types of challenge, a court’s ruling on one 
might affect the other. For example, ruling 
that a law is facially invalid “negates any 
need” to address an as-applied challenge. 
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Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 65 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 2014). But if a litigant loses an as-applied 
challenge because the court rules as a matter 
of law that the statute or ordinance was 
constitutionally applied to her, it follows a 
fortiori that the law is not unconstitutional in 
all applications. Dickerson v. Napolitano, 
604 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 
Cty. Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 
140, 154–56 (1979) (holding that criminal 
defendants could not mount a facial 
challenge to a statute that had been 
constitutionally applied at their trial); United 
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24–25 (1960); 
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882–
83 (4th Cir. 2013); Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 
927, 933 (8th Cir. 2005). If the litigant loses 
an as-applied challenge because the law was 
not in fact applied, or the law did no work in 
authorizing the Government’s challenged 
conduct, then courts should be careful to 
ensure that any remaining challenges are 
justiciable. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
564 U.S. 552, 569 (2011) (noting that, in Los 
Angeles Police Department v. United 
Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 
40–41 (1999), a facial challenge was 
unavailable because “the plaintiff had not 
suffered a personal First Amendment injury 
and could prevail only by invoking the rights 
of others”). 
 
On the other hand, there are situations 
where a failure on one claim might not 
preclude success on the other. If a litigant 
loses an as-applied challenge because the 
allegedly unconstitutional circumstances of 
enforcement are simply “not supported by 
[the] record,” Heffner, 745 F.3d at 65 n.7, and 
the litigant otherwise has standing to 
challenge a law (such as a defendant in an 
enforcement action), then “a court cannot 
simply refuse to address a facial challenge 
that offers a defendant her last chance to 
argue that the statute being enforced against 
her is constitutionally invalid.” Fallon, Fact 
and Fiction at 963. And of course, a litigant 
who fails to prove that a law is 
unconstitutional in all applications might still 
prove that it was applied unconstitutionally to 
her. Cf. Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2305 (2016) 
(holding that losing earlier preenforcment 
facial challenge did not preclude 
postenforcement as-applied challenge). 
 
A recent illustration of these 
principles is Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 
2443 (2015), where the Supreme Court 
approved of a standalone facial challenge 
arising under the Fourth Amendment. Patel 
involved an ordinance that authorized law 
enforcement officials to search hotel 
registries without an administrative warrant. 
Several hotel operators sued, claiming that 
the ordinance was facially invalid. In Patel, 
the challenged ordinance had been, and 
would have continued to be, applied against 
the hotels to authorize warrantless searches. 
The parties stipulated as much, satisfying the 
imminence requirement. Id. at 2448. Thus, 
the plaintiffs presented a dispute about 
whether their rights would be violated as a 
function of the ordinance’s facial validity. 
Similarly, in our recent decision in Free 
Speech Coalition, the plaintiffs demonstrated 
an imminent risk that they would be 
subjected to an allegedly unconstitutional 
inspection regime. 825 F.3d at 166–67. Their 
rights likewise turned on the facial validity of 
the law in question. 
 
 Not so here. Knick makes no 
reasonable allegation that her Fourth 
Amendment rights (or anyone else’s) were, 
or will imminently be, violated. The fact that 
Knick challenges the Ordinance on its face 
does not relieve her from that fundamental 
burden. 
 
 
*      *       * 
 119 
 
 We recognize that the Ordinance’s 
inspection provision “is constitutionally 
suspect and we encourage the [Township] to 
abandon it (or, at least, to modify it 
substantially).” Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 143. It 
is difficult to imagine a broader authorization 
to conduct searches of privately owned 
property. But we are not a “roving 
commission[] assigned to pass judgment on 
the validity of the Nation’s laws.” Broadrick, 
413 U.S. at 611. We cannot adjudicate the 
merits of the inspection provision without a 
plaintiff who has a cognizable interest in the 
outcome. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
dismissal of Knick’s remaining Fourth 
Amendment claim on the alternative ground 
that Knick lacks standing 
 
IV 
 
We turn then to Knick’s Fifth 
Amendment takings claims. Knick argues 
that the Ordinance effectuates an 
uncompensated taking of her private property 
by requiring her to hold her land open to the 
public and to Township inspectors.  
 
Before a takings claim is ripe, 
plaintiffs should (subject to certain 
exceptions) comply with two prudential 
requirements set forth in the Supreme Court’s 
decision Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of 
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). First, the 
“finality rule” requires that the government 
“has reached a final decision regarding the 
application of the regulation to the property 
at issue.” Id. at 186. Second, the plaintiff 
must seek and be denied just compensation 
using the state’s procedures, provided those 
procedures are adequate. Id. at 194. 
 
In this case, the Township argues that 
Knick failed to comply with the second 
Williamson County prong, exhaustion of 
state-law compensation remedies, because 
Knick did not pursue inverse-condemnation 
proceedings under Pennsylvania’s Eminent 
Domain Code, 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 101 
et seq. See Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 
286, 291 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
plaintiffs’ takings claim was not ripe because 
they did not file an inverse-condemnation 
petition). Knick responds that she was not 
required to pursue inverse-condemnation 
proceedings for three reasons. First, Knick 
argues that her facial takings claim is exempt 
from exhaustion. Second, Knick argues that 
she did in fact comply with Williamson 
County by unsuccessfully suing for 
declaratory and injunctive relief in state 
court. And third, Knick argues that we should 
overlook Williamson County’s prudential 
requirements in the interest of efficiency. We 
reject all three arguments. 
 
A 
 
First, Knick argues that her facial 
takings claim need not be exhausted through 
state-court procedures. Specifically, Knick 
asserts that this Court wrongly decided 
County Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 
442 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2006), the case relied 
upon by the District Court, which required 
exhaustion for a similar facial claim. We 
cannot overrule our own precedent, but we 
nonetheless conclude that Knick’s argument 
is misplaced. 
 
There is no question that the first 
prong of Williamson County, the finality rule, 
does not apply to “a claim that the mere 
enactment of a regulation . . . constitutes a 
taking without just compensation.” Id. at 164. 
That exception to the finality rule makes 
sense: if the mere enactment of the ordinance 
constitutes a taking, there would be no need 
to wait for any “final decision.” See CMR 
D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 
612, 626–27 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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The question before us is whether 
facial claims are also exempt from the second 
prong of Williamson County, the exhaustion 
of state-law compensation remedies. In 
County Concrete, this Court held that “a 
facial Just Compensation Takings claim . . . 
does not relieve [plaintiffs] from the duty to 
seek just compensation from the state.” 442 
F.3d at 168. The District Court correctly 
applied that holding here. 
 
Knick argues, however, that our 
decision in County Concrete is contrary to 
Supreme Court authority. For example, in 
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, the 
Supreme Court stated that the petitioners 
“have overstated the reach of Williamson 
County throughout this litigation” because 
the petitioners were “never required to ripen” 
their facial claims. 545 U.S. 323, 345 (2005). 
Similarly, in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, the Supreme Court noted 
that facial challenges “are generally ripe the 
moment the challenged regulation or 
ordinance is passed.” 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 
(1997); see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 
U.S. 519, 533–34 (1992). 
 
We clarify that there is no conflict 
between these lines of authority and that 
Williamson County’s second prong is 
applicable to this case. 
 
1 
 
This “seeming inconsistency” in the 
law arises because the Supreme Court has 
used the word “facial” in two ways. Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 
401, 406 (9th Cir. 1996). First, the Supreme 
Court has referred to a type of taking as 
“facial”—where “the mere enactment of a 
statute constitutes a taking.” Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470, 494 (1987). Second, the Supreme 
Court has used the word “facial” to refer to a 
type of legal challenge that seeks to 
invalidate a taking rather than obtain just 
compensation. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 534 
(describing a facial challenge as one that 
“does not depend on the extent to which 
petitioners are . . . compensated”). These two 
uses of the term “facial” are conceptually 
distinct. 
 
Regarding the first use—“facial 
taking”—it is important to understand that 
the government does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment simply because one of its 
actions “constitutes a taking.” Bituminous 
Coal, 480 U.S. at 494. The Fifth Amendment 
“does not prohibit the taking of private 
property, but instead places a condition on 
the exercise of that power”: the provision of 
just compensation. First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of L.A., 
482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987); see Cty. Concrete, 
442 F.3d at 168 (“[T]he Fifth Amendment 
bars not just the taking of property, but the 
taking of property without just 
compensation.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Thus, “even if a zoning ordinance, 
on its face, ‘takes’ property for Fifth 
Amendment purposes, no constitutional 
violation occurs until the state refuses to 
justly compensate the property owner.” 
Sinclair Oil, 96 F.3d at 406. Accordingly, a 
facial taking is not automatically 
unconstitutional; it simply “gives rise to an 
unqualified constitutional obligation to 
compensate” the property owner. Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320 (2002). 
 
The second use—“facial 
challenge”—describes a type of claim, not a 
type of taking. A plaintiff who brings a facial 
challenge attacks the “underlying validity” of 
a law or regulation that allegedly effectuates 
a taking. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 
U.S. 528, 543 (2005). “No amount of 
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compensation can authorize” a taking rooted 
in a facially invalid law. Id. When a party 
challenges the fundamental validity of a law, 
the claim turns on an issue that arises 
logically and temporally prior to the denial of 
compensation. As such, there is no reason to 
wait for compensation to be denied; the 
constitutional violation would occur at the 
moment the invalid statute or regulation 
becomes effective. 
 
This distinction between the facial 
takings and facial challenges explains how 
our decision in County Concrete is fully 
compatible with the Supreme Court’s 
statements in San Remo Hotel, Suitum, and 
Yee. Those Supreme Court cases each 
describe a facial challenge. See, e.g., San 
Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345–46 (noting that 
the plaintiffs “requested relief distinct from 
the provision of ‘just compensation’”). The 
Court was discussing a now-defunct legal 
theory: the claim that “a general zoning law 
to particular property effects a taking if the 
ordinance does not substantially advance a 
legitimate state interest.” Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). That test 
is no longer good law after Lingle, but 
modern plaintiffs have other tools at their 
disposal to challenge the underlying validity 
of a taking. “[I]f a government action is found 
to be impermissible—for instance because it 
fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or 
is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that 
is the end of the inquiry. No amount of 
compensation can authorize such action.” 
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543. 
 
By contrast, the Fifth Amendment 
claim in County Concrete for which this 
Court required exhaustion was not a facial 
challenge. The taking occurred on the face of 
an ordinance, but the plaintiff merely sought 
compensation. That is why this Court 
emphasized that the claim at issue was “a 
facial Just Compensation Takings claim.” 
Cty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 168 (second and 
third emphases added). The plaintiff’s true 
facial challenges to the law—for violating 
Substantive Due Process and the Equal 
Protection Clause— were not subject to 
exhaustion. Id. at 168–69; see Sinclair Oil, 96 
F.3d at 406 (noting that the “seeming 
inconsistency” should be resolved “by 
analyzing the type of facial taking claim at 
issue in a particular case”). 
 
To summarize, a plaintiff may be 
excused from the first prong of Williamson 
County depending on the type of taking 
alleged. If the taking occurred through an 
exercise of discretion, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the government reached a 
final decision. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 
186. But if the taking occurred on the face of 
a statute, ordinance, or regulation, that 
requirement does not apply. Cty. Concrete, 
442 F.3d at 164–65. As for Williamson 
County’s second prong, the plaintiff may be 
excused from exhausting state-law remedies 
depending on the type of claim asserted and 
the form of relief appropriate for that claim. 
If the plaintiff’s claim is based on a lack of 
compensation—i.e., the claim arises under 
the Just Compensation Clause—then the 
plaintiff must first seek compensation under 
state law (provided the state’s procedures are 
adequate). Id. at 168. If instead the plaintiff 
challenges the underlying validity of the 
taking, perhaps for lacking a public purpose 
or for violating due process, then the denial 
of compensation is irrelevant to the existence 
of a ripe claim and Williamson County’s 
second prong is inapplicable. Id. at 168–69. 
 
2 
 
Despite their being characterized as 
facial challenges, Knick’s claims are, 
unavoidably, claims for compensation. They 
are therefore subject to exhaustion under 
Williamson County. 
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Knick does not claim that the alleged 
taking violates the Public Use Clause. 
Furthermore, the District Court dismissed the 
due-process claims asserted in Knick’s 
original complaint, and Knick does not 
appeal that ruling. All that remains is the 
allegation that the Township violated the 
Fifth Amendment because it took Knick’s 
property without compensation. As pled in 
the Second Amended Complaint: 
 
 
36. The Ordinance requires private 
property owners to allow the general 
public to enter, traverse, and occupy 
their private land, without 
compensation, every day of the year. 
As such, on its face, the Ordinance 
causes an unconstitutional physical 
invasion and taking of private 
property.  
 
37. The Ordinance also causes an 
unconstitutional physical taking on its 
face in authorizing the Township’s 
“Code Enforcement Officer and/or 
his/her agents and representatives” to 
enter, traverse and occupy private 
property for the purpose of 
determining the “existence” of any 
cemetery, without any provision of 
compensation to the effected owners. 
 
. . .  
 
42. As applied to Plaintiff, the 
Ordinance effects an uncompensated 
physical taking of her property by 
requiring Plaintiff to open her private 
property to the public, on pain of civil 
fines and penalties 
 
App. 263–64 (emphases added).  
 
To be sure, Knick’s Second Amended 
Complaint seeks injunctive relief. But Knick 
has no surviving claim that the taking itself 
was invalid, apart from the fact that she has 
not received compensation. The remedy for 
an uncompensated (but otherwise valid) 
taking is compensation. 
 
Knick argues that invalidation of the 
Ordinance is still appropriate because the 
Ordinance does not provide a self contained 
mechanism for compensating property 
owners. This argument is misplaced. “[T]he 
Fifth Amendment [does not] require that just 
compensation be paid in advance of, or 
contemporaneously with, the taking; all that 
is required is that a reasonable, certain and 
adequate provision for obtaining 
compensation exist at the time of the taking.” 
Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). That provision 
here is inverse-condemnation proceedings 
under Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain 
Code. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that 
Knick’s claims arise under the Just 
Compensation Clause subject to exhaustion 
under Williamson County and must therefore 
be exhausted using inverse-condemnation 
proceedings. 
 
B 
 
Second, Knick argues that she 
exhausted state-law remedies because she 
sued unsuccessfully in state court. We 
disagree. 
 
The Eminent Domain Code provides 
the “complete and exclusive procedure and 
law to govern all condemnations of property 
for public purposes and the assessment of 
damages.” 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102(a). 
Knick did not pursue the “complete and 
exclusive procedure” to obtain 
compensation, id., and therefore failed to 
ripen her claims, see Cowell, 263 F.3d at 291. 
 123 
Knick’s state-court action only 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, not 
compensation. As such, Knick could not have 
“been denied compensation” as part of that 
action. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195; see 
Bd. of Supervisors of Shenango Twp. v. 
McClimans, 597 A.2d 738, 742 n.5 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1991) (“[A]ny claim for 
monetary damages is not properly before this 
Court and must be pursued under the 
provisions of the Eminent Domain Code.”). 
Furthermore, the claims for injunctive relief 
presented to the state court (such as Knick’s 
due-process challenge) are no longer before 
us. Even if they were, they would not be 
subject to Williamson County exhaustion. 
Cty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 168–69. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that 
Knick’s earlier state lawsuit did not 
constitute exhaustion of state-law 
compensation remedies for purposes of 
Williamson County’s second prong. 
 
C 
 
Finally, Knick argues that Williamson 
County is a prudential doctrine, and we may 
therefore overlook it in appropriate cases. We 
decline to do so here. 
 
Knick’s initial premise is correct: 
Williamson County’s requirements are 
prudential. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 
S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013). But “merely 
because exhaustion requirements are 
prudential does not mean that they are 
without teeth. Even prudential exhaustion 
requirements will be excused in only a 
narrow set of circumstances.” Wilson v. 
MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) 
 
Several of our sister circuits have 
declined to enforce Williamson County’s 
requirements based on the equities presented 
in individual cases. Knick relies primarily on 
Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 
533, 545 (4th Cir. 2013), and its companion 
case Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728 
F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013). In Sansotta, the 
Fourth Circuit overlooked Williamson 
County because the defendant removed the 
action to federal court, thwarting the 
plaintiff’s effort to exhaust. The defendant’s 
“manipulation” provided strong equitable 
reasons to overlook exhaustion. Sansotta, 
724 F.3d at 545; see also Sherman v. Town of 
Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2014). In 
Toloczko, the property owner was a 
defendant in an action brought by the state to 
compel the demolition of their property. The 
property owners removed the action to 
federal court, and only then asserted 
counterclaims under the Takings Clause. The 
Fourth Circuit noted that, if the owner was 
required to go back to state court, they would 
have been subjected to “piecemeal litigation” 
in two forums at once. 728 F.3d at 399 
(quoting San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 346); 
see also Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2063–64 
(holding that petitioners could raise a takings 
defense in an enforcement action). 
 
For another example, the Ninth 
Circuit declined to enforce Williamson 
County in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 
F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). First, the 
Court rejected the claim on the merits, “so it 
would be a waste of the parties’ and the 
courts’ resources to bounce the case through 
more rounds of litigation.” Id. at 1118. 
Second, the Court noted that “the law 
changed after their trip to state court,” and “it 
is hard to see any value in forcing a second 
trip on them.” Id. 
 
Knick does not argue that inverse-
condemnation proceedings would be 
unavailable or futile. Instead, she argues that 
allowing her claims to proceed would be 
more efficient and would avoid piecemeal 
litigation. But because Knick’s Just 
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Compensation Clause claims are all that 
remain in the case, there is no risk of 
piecemeal litigation comparable to Toloczko. 
Nor has Knick identified any exceptional 
circumstance—such as the Township 
thwarting her access to inverse-
condemnation proceedings as in Sansotta, or 
a change in applicable law after state-court 
proceedings concluded as in Guggenheim. 
Even if it were more efficient to allow 
Knick’s claims to proceed, that would be true 
in any case where a litigant asks a court to 
waive her failure to meet a prudential 
requirement. 
 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit declined to 
enforce Williamson County because it was 
more efficient to simply reject the property 
owner’s claims on the merits. Guggenheim, 
638 F.3d at 1118; see also MHC Fin. Ltd. 
P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1118, 
1130 (9th Cir. 2013). While we do not rule on 
the merits here, we note that Knick’s claims 
do not suffer from any obvious infirmities 
that would tempt us to follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s example. Knick relies on a 
straightforward application of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission, which found it 
“obvious” that an easement for public access 
across private property constituted a 
permanent physical taking. 483 U.S. 825, 831 
(1987); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979). The fact 
that the Ordinance only mandates public 
access during daylight hours does not change 
the fact that land must be accessible every 
day, indefinitely. See Ark. Game & Fish 
Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519 
(2012) (noting that, in United States v. Cress, 
243 U.S. 316 (1917), “‘inevitably recurring’” 
flooding created a permanent condition on 
the land, which “gave rise to a takings claim 
no less valid than the claim of an owner 
whose land was continuously kept under 
water”); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 
1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he concept 
of permanent physical occupation does not 
require that in every instance the occupation 
be exclusive, or continuous and 
uninterrupted.”). 
 
In sum, even prudential requirements 
should not be lightly cast aside. We think 
there is “value in forcing a second trip” to 
state court here. Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 
1118. The Commonwealth’s inverse-
condemnation mechanism is better equipped 
to value Knick’s land than the federal courts, 
and litigants must be incentivized to pursue 
relief through proper channels. Accordingly, 
we will affirm the District Court’s order 
dismissing the takings claims without 
prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law 
compensation remedies. 
 
V 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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“U.S. Supreme Court To Review New Taking Case–Will It Become Easier To File 
Takings Claims In Federal Courts?” 
 
 
Lexology 
Brian J. Connolly 
March 11, 2018 
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a 
petition for certiorari in the case of Knick v. 
Township of Scott. In Knick, the Court is 
being asked to re-examine its 30-year-old 
doctrine requiring takings claimants to 
exhaust state court remedies before filing a 
claim for just compensation stemming from a 
regulatory taking in federal court. The 
decision to grant the petition indicates that at 
least four justices agree that it’s time to 
consider eliminating procedural hurdles 
created by the Court’s 1985 decision 
in Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank. 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution prohibits the government from 
taking private property without justly 
compensating the property owner. The 
Takings Clause has been expanded to allow 
owners to seek compensation in cases where 
government regulation becomes so onerous 
that it effectively takes property. 
Knick addresses a township law requiring 
individual property owners to, without 
compensation, maintain their properties open 
for public access. Rose Mary Knick’s 90-acre 
parcel in western Pennsylvania, which 
includes her personal residence, was 
identified by township officials as being the 
possible site of an ancient burial ground. 
Although Knick attempted to convince the 
township that no documentation proved the 
existence of such a burial ground, the 
township passed an ordinance in 2012 
allowing general public access to any private 
cemetery during daylight hours. Knick 
attempted to block public access to her 
property, but was issued a notice of violation 
by the township’s code enforcement officer. 
Knick first sued in the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas in 2013, claiming that the 
township’s ordinance had effectively taken 
her property. Because the township had not 
yet filed any judicial action against Knick, 
the state court dismissed her claim. She then 
filed suit in federal court, again seeking 
compensation for the alleged taking. The 
federal district court dismissed her claims as 
being unripe, since Knick had not sought 
compensation through state courts. The Third 
Circuit affirmed the district court, similarly 
finding that Knick’s facial and as-applied 
claims were unripe. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari last week. 
At issue in the case is what is frequently 
termed the “state litigation rule.” 
Understanding the rule requires a look back 
at Williamson County. In that case, which 
involved the denial of a plat application by a 
county planning commission and subsequent 
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regulatory taking claim, the Supreme Court 
held that a party bringing a regulatory taking 
claim must first exhaust all state judicial 
remedies before bringing such a claim in 
federal court. The Supreme Court 
specifically found in Williamson County that 
a plaintiff wishing to seek compensation for 
an alleged regulatory taking must first 
exhaust all administrative remedies—
in Williamson County, the plaintiff should 
have sought a variance—and must also avail 
itself of any state procedures for obtaining 
compensation. In most cases, that second 
requirement would have plaintiffs seeking 
compensation through state courts. 
The practical effect of Williamson 
County has been to require plaintiffs seeking 
compensation for alleged takings to proceed 
through lengthy and costly state court 
litigation, all the way to a point of finality, 
before even commencing federal litigation to 
vindicate their Fifth Amendment rights. In 
Colorado, for example, a landowner whose 
land use application was denied and who 
wanted to bring a subsequent regulatory 
taking claim would be required to file an 
action under Colorado Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 106(a)(4), along with a 
regulatory taking claim. The claim would 
need to be litigated through district court and 
then through the Colorado Court of Appeals. 
Only after the Colorado Supreme Court 
either ruled in favor of the defendant or 
denied a petition for certiorari—which could 
be expected to take anywhere from three to 
five years after the denial, and impose 
significant cost—could the plaintiff then file 
a claim in federal district court. 
Property rights advocates have long panned 
the Williamson County decision as imposing 
a serious and unnecessarily high burden on 
property owners who wish to seek 
compensation in the event their property has 
allegedly been taken as a result of an onerous 
regulation. As Knick notes in her petition for 
certiorari, many problems have been 
observed with Williamson County. First, 
because federal courts are required under the 
Constitution to afford full faith and credit to 
state court decisions, most state court takings 
decisions have been found to be 
unreviewable by federal courts. Second, 
because many parties remove takings claims 
to federal court, and federal courts 
subsequently dismiss such claims as unripe, 
the removal of these claims makes them 
effectively unreviewable. 
The plaintiff in Knick asks the Supreme 
Court to do one of two things. It first asks the 
Court to reverse its Williamson 
County decision in order to allow takings 
claimants to bring their claims in federal 
court. In the alternative, Knick asks the Court 
to at least recognize that facial takings claims 
(i.e. claims that a law effects a taking on its 
face) be allowed to proceed to federal court 
without a detour through state court. 
Assuming the Supreme Court grants either 
request, it could be considered a significant 
win for property rights advocates. 
There is no telling what the Court will do 
with Knick. Early indications suggest that 
Justices Thomas and Kennedy are not fond of 
the state litigation rule, as they joined 
together in a dissent from a denial of 
certiorari in an earlier case that attempted to 
seek the Court’s reversal of Williamson 
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County. And given the pro-property rights 
position of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito and Gorsuch, there is a strong initial 
indication that Williamson County’s days are 
numbered. However, the Court has been 
known to surprise, and much remains to be 
seen. 
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“High court May Clarify Decades-Old Procedural Takings Issue” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Andrew McIntyre 
March 13, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to 
hear a case concerning a Pennsylvania 
property owner's struggle to get state and 
federal courts to hear her claim that the 
government has unconstitutionally taken 
value from her land, and lawyers say the 
decision is likely to clarify a murky 
procedural area that for decades has resulted 
in delays and additional costs for real estate 
projects across the country. 
 
The high court in Rose Mary Knick v. 
Township of Scott, Pennsylvania et al. will 
decide whether plaintiff and property owner 
Rose Mary Knick can go directly to federal 
court with a taking claim. Knick owns a 90-
acre farm in western Pennsylvania, and 
government inspectors want to come onto 
Knick's property to search for ancient burial 
sites, but she claims such action is an 
unconstitutional taking. 
 
But the larger question, lawyers say, is how 
the high court will interpret a 33-year-old 
Supreme Court decision that says such 
disputes can only go to federal court after the 
plaintiff has unsuccessfully sought 
compensation in state court. 
 
That 1985 decision, Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton 
Bank of Johnson City, has for decades 
created confusion and delays for real estate 
matters, and lawyers say local governments 
have even used the Williamson decision to 
gain leverage, as a way to slow down certain 
projects. 
 
And the high court's decision will also 
provide clarity on the particular situation 
Knick finds herself in, after a state court 
turned her case away on procedural grounds 
and a federal court said Knick hadn't fulfilled 
the state court requirement under 
Williamson. 
 
"The state court said, 'We don't need to 
decide this. You don't have any claim here.' 
The federal court said, 'You don't have any 
claim here,'" said Janet Johnson of Schiff 
Hardin LLP. "The argument her lawyers are 
making is, 'Look, she's being whipsawed 
between two courts. She hasn't had her day in 
court.'" 
 
After a Pennsylvania state court turned her 
away on procedural grounds, Knick filed a 
lawsuit in federal court, and while the Third 
Circuit acknowledged that Knick's claims 
were serious and concrete, it could not decide 
the case, saying Williamson County does not 
allow federal courts to decide such takings 
matters until individuals have unsuccessfully 
sought compensation in state courts. 
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Williamson County in 1985 dealt with a 
developer who had planned to develop a 
residential and golf course project in 
Tennessee but plans got derailed when local 
officials changed density allowances for the 
project. The developer claimed it had 
experienced a taking, and the high court said 
the developer needed to first seek relief at the 
state court level. 
 
"It's a fascinating case. The Williamson 
County case has just for the last 30 years 
created an absolute mess," said Chris Carr 
of Baker Botts LLP. "Many [of the courts] 
have been confused in applying the exact 
requirements of Williamson County." 
 
Lawyers say municipalities across the 
country have used knowledge that certain 
takings challenges have to first go through 
state court, and then the fact that circuit 
courts have been divided on how to interpret 
that 1985 decision, as ways to gain leverage. 
 
Local municipalities know that landowners 
face long, expensive and unknown processes 
when it comes to challenging takings claims, 
thanks to Williamson County, according to 
experts. 
 
"Local governments have [leverage] if they 
can delay. They have been playing games that 
the lower courts' interpretation, application of 
Williamson County, has allowed. To delay, 
using claims of unlawful land-use," Carr said. 
 
"Local governments gaming the system has 
proliferated under Williamson. The costs of 
delay, legal costs, get passed on to the 
homeowner. This case would clean that up," 
Carr added. 
 
And while attempts have been made over the 
years to get the high court to address 
Williamson, those attempts in the past have 
failed, because the question has always been 
tethered to another question or issue. 
 
This case, though, is unique in that sense: The 
high court will for the first time be looking at 
Williamson as it relates to takings procedural 
issues. 
 
"Oftentimes cases that would present these 
issues wouldn't be clean. The issue wouldn't 
be isolated," Carr said. "There would be other 
issues accompanying it. The difference is this 
presents a really clean vehicle for 
determining this question. There's been a 
growing concern in the federal courts that 
things have gone too far in terms of 
bureaucracy and regulation." 
 
Institute for Justice, National Association of 
Home Builders and Cato Institute have filed 
amici curiae briefs in the case, which experts 
say is important not only for making the 
system less bureaucratic but also for ensuring 
that property owners have access to some 
court, whether it be state or federal. 
 
"For land-use, it's a hugely important case," 
said Bryan Wenter of Miller Starr Regalia. 
"There's a procedural whipsaw. ... You never 
get your opportunity in court." 
 
The case could be remanded back to the Third 
Circuit, if the U.S. Supreme Court decides 
the plaintiff didn't have to go through state 
court in order to get to federal court. 
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"This decision will decide the split so to 
speak between the circuit [courts] that are out 
there," Johnson said. "Some of the circuits 
have said we're going to interpret this 
Williamson case narrowly, and don't have to 
go through proceedings." 
 
And the conservative nature of the court 
could mean a favorable decision for the 
landowner in this case. 
 
Wenter noted that Chief Justice William 
Renquist before dying in 2005 had said that 
he regretted voting yes in Williamson, and 
said if he were to do it over again, he'd vote 
the other way. 
 
"Now you have the case going up with at least 
five members on the far right. It's hard not to 
be optimistic that Williamson County will be 
short-lived," Wenter said. 
 
The Williamson decision, in short, has 
created as a an "administrative regulatory 
thicket" that has existed for 30 years, and the 
high court could iron out myriad wrinkles in 
the system with its decision in Knick v. Scott, 
Carr said. 
 
"There's a growing awareness on the part of 
the court over the last several years that 
agency regulation, whether federal, state, or 
local land-use, can be just a thicket, and that 
the regulators can use the confusion and 
process to make it so that it's economically 
irrational for applicants, developers, to assert 
their legal rights," Carr said. 
 
"This is the court's effort to sort it out," Carr 
added. 
 
Rose Mary Knick is represented by J. David 
Breemer and Deborah J. La Fetra of Pacific 
Legal Foundation. 
 
The Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, is 
represented by Teresa Sachs of Marshall 
Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin PC. 
 
Institute for Justice is represented by Michael 
Berger of Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, 
while National Association of Home Builders 
is represented in-house by Devala Anant 
Janardan and Cato Institute is also 
represented in-house by Ilya Shapiro. 
 
The case is Rose Mary Knick v. Township of 
Scott, Pennsylvania et al., case number 17-
647, in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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“Supreme Court Will Hear Important Property Rights Case: This could result in a 
ruling overturning a terrible 1985 decision that makes it very difficult to bring 
takings cases in federal court” 
 
 
Reason 
 
Ilya Somin 
 
March 5, 2018 
 
Earlier today, the Supreme Court decided to 
review Knick v. Township of Scott, an 
important property rights case. The most 
important issue the Court will consider is 
whether to overrule Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton 
Bank, a 1985 decision that makes it very 
difficult or impossible to bring takings cases 
in federal court. Under Williamson County, a 
property owner who contends that the 
government has taken his property and 
therefores owes "just compensation" under 
the Fifth Amendment, cannot file a case in 
federal court until he or she has first gotten a 
"final decision" from the appropriate state or 
local regulatory agency and has "exhausted" 
all possible remedies in state court. Even 
after all of that, it is often impossible to bring 
a federal claim, because a variety of 
procedural barriers preclude federal courts 
from reviewing state court decisions in cases 
where the case was initially brought in state 
court. In some cases, governments defending 
against takings claims even exercise their 
right to "remove" the case to federal court, 
and then manage to get the case dismissed 
because the property owner did not manage 
to first "exhaust" state court remedies (a 
failure caused by the defendants' own 
decision to get the case removed). 
Williamson County creates an egregious 
Catch-22 trap for property owners: before 
they can bring a claim in federal court, they 
must first go through state courts and 
administrative agencies. But the very act of 
going to state court makes it virtually 
impossible to later appeal the case to a federal 
court! This is the kind of Kafkaesque idiocy 
that gives the legal profession a bad name. 
 
One might ask why it matters whether takings 
cases are litigated in state court or federal 
court. After all, both state and federal judges 
have to apply the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and both have to follow 
relevant federal court precedents. In many 
cases, the result will be the same, regardless 
of venue. But in some situations, particularly 
ones where precedent is unclear and the 
issues may be ambiguous, state courts could 
well be biased against property owners, 
because they have close connections with the 
state and local governments that undermined 
the property rights in question. This may be 
particularly likely in the many states where 
judges are elected, and are therefore part of 
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the same political coalition as local and state 
government officials. 
 
In addition, allowing review in federal court 
helps ensure enforcement of at least a 
minimal uniform floor of constitutional rights 
through the nation. That, after all, is one of 
the main purposes of having federal 
constitutional rights in the first place. As 
prominent nineteenth century Supreme Court 
Justice Joseph Story explained in Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee, a famous 1816 decision, one 
of the main reasons why federal courts have 
ultimate jurisdiction over federal 
constitutional issues is "the importance, and 
even necessity of uniformity of decisions 
throughout the whole United States, upon all 
subjects within the purview of the 
constitution." Story also warned that the 
availability of federal judicial review is 
essential to prevent enforcement of 
constitutional rights from being impeded by 
state court bias in favor of their own state 
governments: 
 
The Constitution has presumed... that 
State attachments, State prejudices, 
State jealousies, and State interests 
might sometimes obstruct or control, 
or be supposed to obstruct or control, 
the regular administration of justice. 
Hence, in controversies between 
States, between citizens of different 
States, between citizens claiming 
grants under different States, between 
a State and its citizens, or foreigners, 
and between citizens and foreigners, 
it enables the parties, under the 
authority of Congress, to have the 
controversies heard, tried, and 
determined before the national 
tribunals. 
 
The Catch-22 problem Williamson 
County creates for takings claimants has no 
parallel with respect to other constitutional 
rights. Citizens who believe state or local 
governments have violated their rights to free 
speech, freedom of religion, or freedom from 
race and sex discrimination, are not required 
to first "exhaust" state court remedies before 
bringing a case in federal court. 
 
The supposed justification for Williamson 
County is that the state or local government 
has not really "taken" property until the 
action in question has been validated by state 
administrative agencies and state courts. But, 
by the same reasoning, one can argue that a 
state has not really censored speech or 
suppressed religion until state agencies and 
state courts uphold the policy in question. If 
a state or local government has taken 
property without paying compensation, that 
is a violation of the Takings Clause, 
regardless of whether other state officials 
might later decide to reverse that action. 
 
In the 2005 case of San Remo Hotel v. City 
and County of San Francisco, then-Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist wrote a 
concurring opinion, joined by three other 
justices (including Clarence Thomas, Sandra 
Day O'Connor, and current Supreme Court 
swing-voter Anthony Kennedy), in which he 
admitted he had been wrong to vote with the 
majority in Williamson County, and urged the 
Court to reconsider it in a future case: 
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As the Court 
recognizes,... Williamson County all 
but guarantees that claimants will be 
unable to utilize the federal courts to 
enforce the Fifth Amendment's just 
compensation guarantee. The basic 
principle that state courts are 
competent to enforce federal rights 
and to adjudicate federal takings 
claims is sound,... and would apply to 
any number of federal claims.... But 
that principle does not explain why 
federal takings claims in particular 
should be singled out to be confined 
to state court, in the absence of any 
asserted justification or congressional 
directive. 
 
I joined the opinion of the Court 
in Williamson County. But further 
reflection and experience lead me to 
think that the justifications for its 
state-litigation requirement are 
suspect, while its impact on takings 
plaintiffs is dramatic. 
 
The San Remo majority suggested that 
takings cases can be left to state courts 
because "state courts . . . have more 
experience than federal courts do in resolving 
complex, factual, technical, and legal 
questions relating to zoning and land-use 
regulations." But, of course, the same thing 
can be said of many other types of 
constitutional claims against state and local 
governments, where state judges are likely to 
know more about the relevant "factual" and 
"technical" issues than federal courts do. 
 
As Rehnquist belatedly 
recognized, Williamson County creates a 
double standard under which Takings Clause 
claims are denied access to federal court in 
situations where other constitutional rights 
claims would be allowed. This doctrine is a 
manifestation of the longstanding second 
class status of constitutional property rights, 
which the Supreme Court has gradually 
begun to reverse in recent years. Hopefully, 
the justices will take another step in the right 
direction by eliminating an indefensible 
anomaly in its constitutional jurisprudence. 
 
For the factual background to the Knick case, 
see this site created by the Pacific Legal 
Foundation, the public interest law firm 
representing the property owners in the case. 
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“Woman asks U.S. Supreme Court to hear Scott Twp. Cemetery dispute” 
 
 
The Times Tribune 
 
Terrie Morgan-Besecker 
 
November 14, 2017 
 
A Scott Twp. woman is asking the U.S. 
Supreme Court to hear her challenge of a 
cemetery ordinance that would force her to 
allow public access to her property. 
The cemetery is believed to have the graves 
of a Revolutionary War hero and several 
others. 
The filing by the Pacific Legal Foundation on 
behalf of Rose Mary Knick marks the latest 
legal maneuver in a lengthy battle she waged 
with the township over a 2012 ordinance that 
regulates cemeteries. 
The case centers on a dispute between Knick 
and Robert Vail of Scott Twp., who claims 
several of his relatives are buried on a section 
of Knick’s 90-acre property on Country Club 
Road. Knick disputes that there are any grave 
sites on the property and refuses to allow Vail 
access. 
Knick filed suit in federal court in 2014, 
alleging a township official violated her 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
illegal search and seizure when he entered her 
property to search for the grave sites. A 
federal judge dismissed the case, finding the 
property is an open field, which is not 
protected under the Fourth Amendment. The 
3rd Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that 
decision in July. 
The Pacific Legal Foundation, a California-
based nonprofit that fights for landowners’ 
rights, agreed to represent Knick before the 
U.S. Supreme Court at no cost, David 
Breemer, a senior attorney for the 
organization, said in a press release. 
“Scott Twp.’s graveyard law forces property 
owners to allow warrantless searches by 
government and unbridled trespassing by the 
public,” Breemer said in the release. 
Breemer recently filed a motion asking the 
high court to hear Knick’s appeal of the 3rd 
Circuit Court ruling. The court accepts only a 
fraction of the thousands of cases referred to 
it each year. It is not known yet if it will take 
the case. 
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“Woman Told Her 90 Acres Now Public After Anonymous Claim of Grave” 
 
 
WND 
 
Bob Unruh 
 
November 2, 2017 
 
A Pennsylvania woman fighting her local 
government’s decision to open her private 
property to the public is demanding to know 
where in the U.S. Constitution one can 
find “warrantless searches” and “unbridled 
trespassing.” 
The case is being presented to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, since state courts have 
insisted precedent doesn’t allow them to rule, 
and federal courts say they won’t take action 
until the state courts do something. 
The suit was filed by Rose Mary Knick, who 
lives alone on about 90 acres of Pennsylvania 
land that has been in her family for nearly 
half a century. 
Officials in Scott Township abruptly decided 
to create a law taking away the private 
property rights of landowners if anyone 
even suspects there was an old gravesite on 
the land. 
No proof was necessary for the law to then 
require that the landowner provide daily 
public access for anyone to trespass. 
Knick is asking the high court to overturn the 
law as a violation of her constitutionally 
protected property rights. 
“Scott Township’s graveyard law forces 
property owners to allow warrantless 
searches by government and unbridled 
trespassing by the public,” said Pacific Legal 
Foundation Senior Attorney J. David 
Breemer. “The Supreme Court should take 
Ms. Knick’s case to make sure the township 
does not get away with its flagrant 
abridgement of constitutionally protected 
rights.” 
Her land is used for grazing for cattle, horses 
and other animals. It’s bounded by fences, 
stone walls and “No Trespassing” signs. 
“There is no cemetery mentioned in the chain 
of title going back hundreds of years,” said 
Pacific Legal Foundation, which has won 
numerous property rights cases at the 
Supreme Court. 
“Nevertheless, in 2013, a town enforcement 
officer entered the property searching for 
graveyards. Soon after, Ms. Knick was issued 
a notice of violation claiming her property 
contained an old burial ground that had not 
been kept open to the public. She later 
received a second notice of violation.” 
Knick said: “It was unbelievable that the 
town would trample all over my rights this 
way, making it open season for trespassing 
 136 
on my land. I am very hopeful that the 
Supreme Court will take a stand for the 
Constitution, and for everybody’s property 
rights, by striking down this outrageous law.” 
Isolated grave sites are not uncommon in 
parts of the country where there is no ban on 
burials on private ground. And, indeed, 
sometimes burials date back to before rules 
and regulations were in place. So the plains 
of Pennsylvania contain small burial plots for 
families. 
However, the records don’t show any such 
location on Knick’s land, PLF said. 
The township simply adopted procedures for 
its “code enforcement” agents to search her 
land without permission, and while 
trespassing, they claimed to have found stone 
evidence of burial plots. 
The lower courts then decided the township 
had created a “right of way” for the public. 
The township issued her citations, but when 
the arguments began in state court, suddenly 
withdrew them. The state court then said it 
couldn’t make a decision until an 
enforcement action was pending. 
When Knick then went to federal court, the 
judge there claimed an adjudication in state 
court was required first. 
“What a mess,” the petition to the high court 
said. “The Constitution requires a 
‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision 
for obtaining compensation.’ But this is 
exactly what [precedent] prevents. It creates 
a chaotic and unworkable system for 
adjudicating federal takings claims.” 
PLF President Steven D. Anderson said his 
group “fights for individual liberty, a core 
component of which is protection from 
unconstitutional government intrusion on 
one’s property and privacy.” 
“Defending property rights also means 
insisting that landowners who have suffered 
constitutional wrongs have direct access to 
federal court for redress. Securing these 
protections requires determination and 
vigilance, and we look forward to vindicating 
these vital principles,” he said. 
The demand for access to Knick’s land came 
after an anonymous “citizen inquiry” claimed 
there was a burial ground there. 
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“Supreme Court Poised to Overrule Requirement that Takings Claims be Filed In 
State Court” 
 
 
Lexology 
 
James B. Slaughter and Gus B. Bauman 
 
March 13, 2018 
 
Signaling a possible sea change in takings 
law, the United States Supreme Court has 
accepted for review the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Rose Mary Knick v. Scott 
Township, Pennsylvania, 862 F.3d 310 (3d 
Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 1143827 
(March 5, 2018). The Court will reconsider 
its 1985 holding in Williamson County v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, that required 
property owners to exhaust State court 
remedies in order to pursue a federal takings 
claim. A Pennsylvania property owner is 
asking the Court to overrule Williamson 
County’s State litigation ripeness doctrine so 
that citizens may bring a takings claim for 
just compensation under the U.S. 
Constitution directly in federal court. 
The Court seems prepared to do exactly that, 
which would remove a tremendous 
procedural and practical barrier to pursuit of 
takings claims against local and State 
governments that impose unreasonable 
conditions and exactions on land use projects. 
Land owners, developers, and facility owners 
will need to follow this case closely and make 
sure their perspectives on this vital issue are 
heard by the Supreme Court. 
For decades the Court has come under 
criticism for creating in Williamson County a 
ripeness rule unique to the Bill of Rights. 
Forcing federal takings litigation into State 
court has led to great confusion, litigation 
gamesmanship by localities, and the wasting 
of resources by complainants and courts 
alike. 
In Williamson County, a development 
company had sued in federal district court 
when a Tennessee county halted an on-going 
residential subdivision. The federal court in a 
jury trial found violations of due process and 
a taking of property under the U.S. 
Constitution, awarding damages and just 
compensation for the taking. The Sixth 
Circuit appeals court affirmed. But the 
Supreme Court reversed, announcing a new 
procedural doctrine: takings cases against 
localities and States are to be filed in the State 
courts under State takings laws. Williamson 
County, 473 U.S. at 194-97. 
Four justices questioned this holding twenty 
years later, in San Remo Hotel v. San 
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005), which held 
that takings plaintiffs were precluded from 
re-litigating claims in federal court under 
issue preclusion doctrine. A four-Justice 
concurring opinion went out of its way to 
question Williamson County’s ripeness rule, 
writing that “part of our decision 
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in Williamson County . . . may have been 
mistaken.” San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348. 
Now comes Rose Mary Knick. She owns a 
90-acre parcel of land in Scott Township, 
Pennsylvania. Ms. Knick lives in a house on 
the parcel, which also includes farmland and 
grazing areas. In 2008, responding to a 
citizen’s inquiry about a possible ancient 
burial ground on the Knick land, township 
officials asked her about it. She replied she 
was unaware of a burial ground on her land. 
She also said there was no official State 
documentation of a cemetery. 
The township proceeded to enact a private 
cemeteries ordinance. It required that the 
public be allowed to enter private property to 
visit a burial ground during daylight hours. 
Knick’s land was posted with “No 
Trespassing” signs. 
In 2013, a township enforcement officer 
entered Knick’s property without her 
consent, identified multiple grave markers 
and tombstones, and the next day issued a 
Notice of Violation (NOV) stating that Knick 
must allow the public to visit the grave sites. 
Knick sued Scott Township in State court, 
claiming State constitutional violations, 
including that the ordinance’s public access 
requirement effected a physical taking of her 
property. She sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, but not just compensation. 
The State court declined to rule on the case 
until the township filed a civil enforcement 
action against her. The State case appears to 
be still pending. 
Ms. Knick then brought suit in federal court, 
claiming numerous constitutional violations, 
including violation of the Fifth Amendment’s 
takings clause. She sought just compensation 
and equitable relief. The federal court in 2016 
dismissed an amended complaint, holding the 
takings claim was unripe under Williamson 
County, and that Ms. Knick had to file a new 
inverse condemnation case in State court and 
seek just compensation under State law. The 
Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ripeness ruling in July 2017. Knick v. Scott 
Township, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir.). 
Ms. Knick’s petition to the Supreme Court 
stresses that “[t]he most well-known problem 
associated with Williamson County arises 
from the tension between the state court 
litigation ripeness rule and the Full Faith and 
Credit statute . . . [that] bars federal courts 
from hearing a case after a related state court 
suit. . . . Accordingly, when a plaintiff 
unsuccessfully litigates for compensation in 
state court to comply with Williamson, any 
[federal] takings claim ripened by this 
process is impermissible in federal court 
because of preclusion barriers.”[1] 
The petition then highlights the other 
significant takings Catch-22 known well by 
practitioners -- namely, that the State court 
route “is often illusory due to…the principle 
that a government defendant may remove 
certain cases from state court to federal 
court.” That includes takings cases. Such 
“[r]emoval prevents state court litigation, and 
renders the removed claim unripe in the new 
federal forum under Williamson County.” 
A third major point raised in the petition is a 
practical one: “In almost all takings cases, the 
state court is not the government body taking 
property, nor does it bear compensatory 
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liability for a taking. These qualities fall on 
the shoulders of the executive or legislative 
agency responsible for invading private 
property….Requiring state court litigation in 
such a case adds nothing to the factual or 
legal sufficiency of a takings claim.” In other 
words, a state court forum adds nothing to the 
adjudication of the federal claim. The 
elements of proving a takings claim under the 
U.S. Constitution remain the same whether in 
state or federal court. 
Petitioner Knick’s opening merits brief to the 
Supreme Court is due by May 21, 2018. 
Amici briefs in support of Petitioner are due 
within seven days of that filing. Oral 
argument will likely occur in the fall of 2018 
or early 2019. Average time for a Supreme 
Court opinion after argument is three months. 
It appears there are at least five Justices ready 
to overrule the Williamson County ripeness 
doctrine for being the constitutional anomaly 
it is. We should know in about a year. Parties 
considering filing takings claims should 
carefully consider the timing of their lawsuits 
to take advantage of the likely reopening of 
the federal courts to these claims. 
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Ruling Below: Markle Interests v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 827 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2016) 
 
Overview: The endangered dusky gopher frog can only survive in a habitat that meets specific 
criteria. The Fish and Wildlife Service designated over 1500 acres of privately owned forest in 
Louisiana as a “critical habitat” for the frog, halting the development of the land at a cost of up to 
$34 million. The dusky gopher frog does not live in the designated land, nor has the frog been 
spotted in the designated land for over 50 years, since the land doesn’t meet the specific criterion 
for the endangered species.  
 
Issue: (1) Whether the Endangered Species Act prohibits designation of private land as unoccupied 
critical habitat that is neither habitat nor essential to species conservation; and (2) whether an 
agency decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat because of the economic impact of 
designation is subject to judicial review. 
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:  
 
 This appeal requires us to consider 
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
inclusion of private land in a critical-habitat 
designation under the Endangered Species 
Act. Misconceptions exist about how critical-
habitat designations impact private property. 
Critical-habitat designations do not transform 
private land into wildlife refuges. A 
designation does not authorize the 
government or the public to access private 
lands. Following designation, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service cannot force private 
landowners to introduce endangered species 
onto their land or to make modifications to 
their land. In short, a critical-habitat 
designation alone does not require private 
landowners to participate in the conservation 
of an endangered species. In a thorough 
opinion, District Judge Martin L. C. Feldman 
held that the Fish and Wildlife Service 
properly applied the Endangered Species Act 
to private land in St. Tammany Parish, 
Louisiana. As we discuss below, we 
AFFIRM Judge Feldman’s judgment 
upholding this critical-habitat designation. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
This case is about a frog—the Rana 
sevosa—commonly known as the dusky 
gopher frog. These frogs spend most of their 
lives underground in open- canopied pine 
forests. They migrate to isolated, ephemeral 
ponds to breed. Final Designation, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 35,129. Ephemeral ponds are only 
seasonally flooded, leaving them to dry out 
cyclically and making it impossible for 
predatory fish to survive. See id. at 35,129, 
35,131. After the frogs are finished breeding, 
they return to their underground habitats, 
followed by their offspring. Id. at 35,129. 
When the dusky gopher frog was listed as an 
endangered species, there were only about 
100 adult frogs known to exist in the wild. 
Although, historically, the frog was found in 
parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Alabama, today, the frog exists only in 
Mississippi. Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 
62,993–94; Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 35,132. The primary threat to the frog is 
habitat degradation. Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 
at 62,994. 
 
In 2010, under the Endangered 
Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531– 
1544, the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service (“the Service”) published a proposed 
rule to designate 1,957 acres in Mississippi as 
“critical habitat” for the dusky gopher frog. 
In response to concerns raised during the 
peer-review process about the sufficiency of 
this original proposal, the Service’s final 
designation of critical habitat expanded the 
area to 6,477 acres in four counties in 
Mississippi and one parish in Louisiana. See 
Revised Proposal, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,776; 
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,118–
19. The designated area in Louisiana (“Unit 
1”) consists of 1,544 acres in St. Tammany 
Parish. Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
35,118. Although the dusky gopher frog has 
not occupied Unit 1 for decades, the land 
contains historic breeding sites and five 
closely clustered ephemeral ponds. See 
Revised Proposal, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,783; 
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,123–
24, 35,133, 35,135. The final critical-habitat 
designation was the culmination of two 
proposed rules, economic analysis, two 
rounds of notice and comment, a scientific 
peer-review process including responses 
from six experts, and a public hearing. See 
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,119. 
 
 142 
Together, Plaintiffs–Appellants 
Markle Interests, L.L.C., P&F Lumber 
Company 2000, L.L.C., PF Monroe 
Properties, L.L.C., and Weyerhaeuser 
Company (collectively, “the Landowners”) 
own all of Unit 1. Weyerhaeuser Company 
holds a long-term timber lease on all of the 
land that does not expire until 2043. The 
Landowners intend to use the land for 
residential and commercial development and 
timber operations. Through consolidated 
suits, all of the Landowners filed actions for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 
against the Service, its director, the 
Department of the Interior, and the Secretary 
of the Interior. The Landowners challenged 
only the Service’s designation of Unit 1 as 
critical habitat, not the designation of land in 
Mississippi. 
 
The district court allowed the Center 
for Biological Diversity and the Gulf 
Restoration Network (collectively, “the 
Intervenors”) to intervene as defendants in 
support of the Service’s final designation. All 
parties filed cross- motions for summary 
judgment. Although Judge Feldman granted 
summary judgment in favor of the 
Landowners on the issue of standing, he 
granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Service on the merits. See Markle Interests, 
LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 40 F. Supp. 
3d 744, 748, 769 (E.D. La. 2014). The 
Landowners timely appealed. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo. Nola Spice 
Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., Inc., 783 
F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Sabine 
River Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 
669, 679 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the court 
of appeals reviews the administrative record 
de novo when the district court reviewed an 
agency’s decision by way of a motion for 
summary judgment). Our review of the 
Service’s administration of the ESA is 
governed by the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”). See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 
154, 171–75 (1997) (holding that a claim 
challenging the Service’s alleged 
“maladministration of the ESA” is not 
reviewable under the citizensuit provisions of 
the ESA, but is reviewable under the APA); 
see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. When 
reviewing agency action under the APA, this 
court must “set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) 
contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege, or immunity; [or] (C) in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  
 
Review under the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard is “extremely limited and 
highly deferential,” Gulf Restoration 
Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227, 243 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), and “there is a presumption that the 
agency’s decision is valid,” La. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n v. F.E.R.C., 761 F.3d 540, 558 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The plaintiff has the burden of 
overcoming the presumption of validity. La. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 761 F.3d at 558.  
 
Under the arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard, 
 
we will not vacate an agency’s 
decision unless it has relied on factors 
which Congress had not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the problem, 
offered an explanation for its decision 
that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be 
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ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise. 
 
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). We must be 
mindful not to substitute our judgment for the 
agency’s. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009). That said, we 
must still ensure that “[the] agency 
examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] 
a satisfactory explanation for its action.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “We will 
uphold an agency’s action if its reasons and 
policy choices satisfy minimum standards of 
rationality.” 10 Ring Precision, Inc. v. Jones, 
722 F.3d 711, 723 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The Landowners raise three 
challenges to the Service’s designation of 
Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher 
frog. They argue that the designation (1) 
violates the ESA and the APA, (2) exceeds 
the Service’s constitutional authority under 
the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3, and (3) violates the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. As we discuss below, 
each of their arguments fails. 
 
I. Endangered Species Act 
 
 Congress enacted the ESA “to 
provide a means whereby the ecosystems 
upon which endangered species . . . depend 
may be conserved” and “to provide a 
program for the conservation of such 
endangered species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
The ESA broadly defines “conservation.” It 
includes “the use of all methods and 
procedures which are necessary to bring any 
endangered species . . . to the point at which 
the measures provided [by the ESA] are no 
longer necessary.” Id. § 1532(3). In other 
words, “the objective of the ESA is to enable 
[endangered] species not merely to survive, 
but to recover from their endangered or 
threatened status.” Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 
2001); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 
U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (“The plain intent of 
Congress in enacting this statute was to halt 
and reverse the trend toward species 
extinction, whatever the cost. This is 
reflected not only in the stated policies of the 
Act, but in literally every section of the 
statute.”). To achieve this objective, the ESA 
requires the Service to first identify and list 
endangered and threatened species. See 16 
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). Listing a species as 
endangered or threatened then triggers the 
Service’s statutory duty to designate critical 
habitat “to the maximum extent prudent and 
determinable.” See id. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i). 
“Critical habitat designation primarily 
benefits listed species through the ESA’s 
[Section 7] consultation mechanism.” Sierra 
Club, 245 F.3d at 439; see 16 U.S.C. § 1536 
(describing the Section 7 consultation 
process). Under this section, once habitat is 
designated as critical, federal agencies are 
prohibited from authorizing, funding, or 
carrying out any action that is likely to result 
in “the destruction or adverse modification” 
of that critical habitat without receiving a 
special exemption. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
To satisfy the requirements of Section 7, 
federal agencies must consult with the 
Service before taking any action that might 
negatively affect critical habitat. Only federal 
agencies—not private parties—must engage 
in this Section 7 consultation process. See id.; 
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). Thus, as Judge 
Feldman explained, “absent a federal nexus, 
[the Service] cannot compel a private 
landowner to make changes to restore his 
designated property into optimal habitat.” 
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 750. 
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A. Standing 
 
 Before addressing the merits of the 
Service’s critical-habitat designation, we first 
address whether the Landowners have 
standing to challenge the designation. “The 
question of standing involves both 
constitutional limitations on federal-court 
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its 
exercise.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In particular, to 
establish standing under the APA, in addition 
to Article III standing, a plaintiff must show 
that “the interest sought to be protected by the 
[plaintiff] is arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the 
statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question.” Id. at 175 (quoting Ass’n of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). Although the district 
court correctly held that the APA provided 
the proper vehicle for the Landowners to 
challenge the Service’s administration of the 
ESA, the district court did not address the 
APA’s zone-of-interests test; instead, it held 
only that the Landowners have standing 
under Article III. On appeal, the Service did 
not brief the zone-of-interests issue or 
challenge the district court’s conclusion that 
the Landowners have Article III standing.  
 
Even though the Service did not 
appeal the district court’s standing 
conclusion, we must independently assess the 
Landowners’ Article III standing. See Hang 
On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 
1251 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The federal courts are 
under an independent obligation to examine 
their own jurisdiction, and standing is 
perhaps the most important of the 
jurisdictional doctrines.” (alterations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). “Article 
III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to certain ‘Cases’ and 
‘Controversies.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l 
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). “To 
satisfy the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ 
requirement of Article III, which is the 
‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of 
standing, a plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that 
he has suffered ‘injury in fact,’ that the injury 
is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the 
defendant, and that the injury will likely be 
redressed by a favorable decision.” Bennett, 
520 U.S. at 162 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
The injury must be concrete and 
particularized, as well as actual or imminent. 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Crane v. 
Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(“Although imminence is concededly a 
somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be 
stretched beyond its purpose, which is to 
ensure that the alleged injury is not too 
speculative for Article III purposes—that the 
injury is certainly impending.”). “The party 
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden 
of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 561. 
 
Here, the Landowners assert two 
alleged injuries: lost future development and 
lost property value. The first—loss of future 
development— is too speculative to support 
Article III standing. Although “[a]n increased 
regulatory burden typically satisfies the 
injury in fact requirement,” Contender 
Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 779 
F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 2015), any regulatory 
burden on Unit 1 is purely speculative at this 
point. As the Service emphasized in the 
designation, if future development occurring 
on Unit 1 avoids impacting jurisdictional 
wetlands, no federal permit would be 
required and the ESA’s Section 7 
consultation process would not be triggered. 
See Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,126 
(noting that the range of possible economic 
impact to Unit 1 of $0 to $33.9 million 
“reflects uncertainty regarding future land 
use”); id. at 35,140 (observing that 
“considerable uncertainty exists regarding 
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the likelihood of a Federal nexus for 
development activities [in Unit 1]”); see also 
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 
402.14(a). Judge Feldman similarly stressed 
this point, explaining that, “if a private 
party’s action has no federal nexus (if it is not 
authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal 
agency), no affirmative obligations are 
triggered by the critical habitat designation.” 
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 750. 
 
Because the Landowners have not 
provided evidence that specific development 
projects are likely to be impacted by Section 
7 consultation, lost future development is too 
speculative to support standing. See Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 564 (“Such ‘some day’ 
intentions—without any description of 
concrete plans, or indeed even any 
specification of when the some day will be—
do not support a finding of the ‘actual or 
imminent’ injury that our cases require.”); 
see also Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147–48 
(holding that plaintiffs did not have standing 
to challenge the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act in part because they 
provided no evidence supporting their 
“highly speculative fear” that the government 
would imminently target communications to 
which plaintiffs were parties); Crane, 783 
F.3d at 252 (holding that Mississippi did not 
have standing to challenge the federal 
government’s deferred-action policy because 
its injury was “purely speculative” and 
because it failed to “produce evidence of 
costs it would incur” because of the policy); 
cf. Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 
117–18 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that the 
burdens of Section 7 consultation supported 
standing when the plaintiffs identified 
specific, ongoing development projects that 
would be delayed because of the consultation 
requirement). 
 
The Landowners’ assertion of lost 
property value, by contrast, is a concrete and 
particularized injury that supports standing. 
See Sabine River Auth., 951 F.2d at 674 
(recognizing that injury in fact includes 
economic injury). The Landowners assert 
that their land has already lost value as a 
result of the critical-habitat designation. 
Indeed, as the Service recognized in its Final 
Economic Analysis, given the “stigma” 
attached to critical-habitat designations, 
“[p]ublic attitudes about the limits or 
restrictions that critical habitat may impose 
can cause real economic effects to property 
owners, regardless of whether such limits are 
actually imposed.” As a result, “a property 
that is designated as critical habitat may have 
a lower market value than an identical 
property that is not within the boundaries of 
critical habitat due to perceived limitations or 
restrictions.” The Service further assumed 
that “any reduction in land value due to the 
designation of critical habitat will happen 
immediately at the time of the designation.” 
 
Causation and redressability flow 
naturally from this injury. If a plaintiff—or, 
here, the plaintiffs’ land—is the object of 
government action, “there is ordinarily little 
question that the action . . . has caused him 
injury, and that a judgment preventing . . . the 
action will redress it.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
561–62. We conclude that the Landowners’ 
decreased property value is fairly traceable to 
the Service’s critical-habitat designation and 
that this injury would likely be redressed by 
a favorable decision. Thus, the Landowners 
have established Article III standing based on 
lost property value.  
 
The question nevertheless remains 
whether the Landowners satisfy the APA’s 
zone-of-interests requirement. See Bennett, 
520 U.S. at 175–77. The Service, however, 
has not argued—either in the district court or 
this court— that the Landowners’ interests 
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fall outside the zone of interests that the ESA 
is designed to protect. “Unlike constitutional 
standing, prudential standing arguments may 
be waived.” Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs v. 
EPA, 674 F.3d 409, 417–18 (5th Cir. 2012). 
Although we have previously considered the 
zone-of-interests issue sua sponte, see Nat’l 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Pine Belt Reg’l 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 389 F.3d 491, 498 
(5th Cir. 2004), we decline to do so here. 
Because the Service failed to raise this 
argument, we hold that the Service has 
forfeited a challenge to the Landowners’ 
standing under the zone-of-interests test. We 
thus conclude that the Landowners have 
standing to challenge the Service’s critical-
habitat designation. 
 
B. Critical- Habitat Designation 
 
 The ESA expressly envisions two 
types of critical habitat: areas occupied by the 
endangered species at the time it is listed as 
endangered and areas not occupied by the 
species at the time of listing. See 16 U.S.C. § 
1532(5)(A)(i)–(ii). To designate an occupied 
area as critical habitat, the Service must 
demonstrate that the area contains “those 
physical or biological features . . . essential to 
the conservation of the species.” Id. § 
1532(5)(A)(i). To designate unoccupied 
areas, the Service must determine that the 
designated areas are “essential for the 
conservation of the species.” Id. § 
1532(5)(A)(ii). As Judge Feldman noted 
below, “Congress did not define ‘essential’ 
but, rather, delegated to the Secretary the 
authority to make that determination.” 
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 760. Thus, 
when the Service promulgates, in a formal 
rule, a determination that an unoccupied area 
is “essential for the conservation” of an 
endangered species, Chevron deference is 
appropriate. See id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)); Knapp v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., 796 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 
2015) (“[A]dministrative implementation of 
a particular statutory provision qualifies for 
Chevron deference when it appears [(1)] that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of 
law, and [(2)] that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.” (alterations in 
original)). 
 
 The Service must designate critical 
habitat “on the basis of the best scientific data 
available and after taking into consideration 
the economic impact, the impact on national 
security, and any other relevant impact, of 
specifying any particular area as critical 
habitat.” Id. § 1533(b)(2). “When examining 
this kind of scientific determination, as 
opposed to simple findings of fact, a 
reviewing court must generally be at its most 
deferential.” Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 
(1983); Medina Cnty. Envtl. Action Ass’n v. 
Surface Transp. Bd., 602 F.3d 687, 699 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (“Where an agency’s particular 
technical expertise is involved, we are at our 
most deferential in reviewing the agency’s 
findings.”). 
 
 In addition, under the regulations in 
place at the time of the critical-habitat 
designation at issue here, before the Service 
could designate unoccupied land as critical 
habitat, it first had to make a finding that “a 
designation limited to [a species’] present 
range would be inadequate to ensure the 
conservation of the species.” 50 C.F.R. § 
424.12(e) (2012) (emphasis added). Unit 1 is 
unoccupied. Thus, under its own regulations, 
the Service first had to make an inadequacy 
determination. The Service’s first proposed 
designation included only land in Mississippi 
and did not include Unit 1. See Original 
Proposal, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,395–99 
(identifying eleven units in Mississippi). 
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During the peer-review and comment process 
on this original proposal, the expert reviewers 
expressed that the designated habitat in the 
proposal was inadequate to ensure the 
conservation of the frog. The experts 
therefore urged the Service to expand the 
designation to Louisiana or Alabama, the two 
other states in the frog’s historical range. See 
Revised Proposal, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,776; 
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,119, 
35,121, 35,123–24. 
 
The Service adopted this consensus 
expert conclusion, finding that designating 
the occupied land in Mississippi was “not 
sufficient to conserve the species.” Final 
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,123. The 
Service explained that “[r]ecovery of the 
dusky gopher frog will not be possible 
without the establishment of additional 
breeding populations of the species,” and it 
emphasized that it was necessary to designate 
critical habitat outside of Mississippi to 
protect against potential local events, such as 
drought and other environmental disasters. 
Id. at 35,124–25. The Service therefore 
determined that “[a]dditional areas that were 
not known to be occupied at the time of 
listing are essential for the conservation of 
the species.” Id. at 35,123. In sum, all of the 
experts agreed that designating occupied land 
alone would not be sufficient to conserve the 
dusky gopher frog. Thus, the Service’s 
prerequisite inadequacy finding—a finding 
that the Landowners did not challenge—was 
not arbitrary and capricious 
 
Having satisfied this preliminary 
requirement, the Service was next required to 
limit the critical-habitat designation to 
unoccupied areas that are “essential for the 
conservation of the species.” 16 U.S.C. § 
1532(5)(A)(ii). The Service focused its 
resources on locating additional ephemeral 
ponds. It explained that it prioritized 
ephemeral ponds because of their rarity and 
great importance for breeding, and because 
they are very difficult to replicate artificially. 
See Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
35,123–24. The Service further explained 
that additional breeding populations are 
necessary for the frog’s recovery and to 
prevent excessive inbreeding. See id. at 
35,121, 35,123– 24. Although the Service has 
created one artificial ephemeral pond in the 
DeSoto National Forest in Mississippi, this 
artificial pond took ten years to construct, and 
it is still unclear whether it will be successful 
as a breeding site. See id. at 35,123. In 
contrast, as an expert explained at the public 
hearing on the Revised Proposal, it is “much 
easier to restore a terrestrial habitat for the 
gopher frog than to restore or build breeding 
ponds.” See also id. at 35123 (“Isolated, 
ephemeral ponds that can be used as the focal 
point for establishing these populations are 
rare, and this is a limiting factor in dusky 
gopher frog recovery.”). As the Service 
explained in the Final Designation, 
“[a]lthough [DeSoto] is crucial to the 
survival of the frog because the majority of 
the remaining frogs occur there, recovery of 
the species will require populations of dusky 
gopher frog distributed across a broader 
portion of the species’ historic distribution.” 
Id. at 35,125. 
 
The Service therefore searched for 
isolated, ephemeral ponds within the 
historical range of the frog in Alabama and 
Louisiana. See Final Designation, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 35,124. The area in Alabama where 
the frog once lived has since been replaced by 
a residential development. See id. The 
Service noted that it was unable to find any 
breeding sites that the frog might use in the 
future in Alabama. See id. In contrast, the 
Service explained that Unit 1’s five 
ephemeral ponds are “intact and of 
remarkable quality.” Id. at 35,133. It noted 
that the ponds in Unit 1 “are in close 
proximity to each other, which would allow 
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movement of adult gopher frogs between 
them” and would “provide metapopulation 
structure that supports long-term survival and 
population resiliency.” Id. “Based on the best 
scientific information available to the 
Service,” the Service concluded that “the five 
ponds in Unit 1 provide breeding habitat that 
in its totality is not known to be present 
elsewhere within the historic range of the 
dusky gopher frog.” Id. at 35,124. 
 
Finally, in addition to ephemeral 
ponds, dusky gopher frogs also require 
upland forested habitat and connected 
corridors that allow them to move between 
their breeding and nonbreeding habitats. See 
id. at 35,131–32. Looking to the upland 
terrestrial habitat surrounding Unit 1’s 
ephemeral ponds, the Service relied on 
scientific measurements and data to draw a 
boundary around Unit 1. The Service used 
digital aerial photography to map the ponds 
and then to delineate critical-habitat units by 
demarcating a buffer zone around the ponds 
by a radius of 621 meters (or 2,037 feet). Id. 
at 35,134. This value, which was based on 
data collected during multiple gopher frog 
studies, represented the median farthest 
distance that frogs had traveled from 
breeding sites (571 meters or 1,873 feet) plus 
an extra 50 meters (or 164 feet) “to minimize 
the edge effects of the surrounding land use.” 
Id. The Service finally used aerial imagery to 
connect critical-habitat areas that were within 
1,000 meters (or 3,281 feet) of each other “to 
create routes for gene flow between breeding 
sites and metapopulation structure.” Id. 
 
Altogether, the Service concluded:  
 
Unit 1 is essential to the conservation 
of the dusky gopher frog because it 
provides: (1) Breeding habitat for the 
dusky gopher frog in a landscape 
where the rarity of that habitat is a 
primary threat to the species; (2) a 
framework of breeding ponds that 
supports metapopulation structure 
important to the long-term survival of 
the dusky gopher frog; and (3) 
geographic distance from extant 
dusky gopher frog populations, which 
likely provides protection from 
environmental stochasticity. 
 
Id. As Judge Feldman reasoned below, “[the 
Service’s] finding that the unique ponds 
located on Unit 1 are essential for the frog’s 
recovery is supported by the ESA and by the 
record; it therefore must be upheld in law as 
a permissible interpretation of the ESA.” 
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 761 
(applying Chevron deference). 
 
On appeal, the Landowners do not 
dispute the scientific or factual support for 
the Service’s determination that Unit 1 is 
essential.14 Instead, they argue that the 
Service “exceeded its statutory authority” 
under the ESA and acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously when it designated Unit 1 as 
critical habitat because Unit 1 is not currently 
habitable, nor “currently supporting the 
conservation of the species in any way,” nor 
reasonably likely to support the conservation 
of the species in the “foreseeable future.” 
They contend that such land cannot rationally 
be called “essential for the conservation of 
the species,” because if it can be, then the 
Service would have “nearly limitless 
authority to burden private lands with a 
critical habitat designation.” 
 
As Judge Feldman noted, Congress 
has not defined the word “essential” in the 
ESA. Hence the Service has the authority to 
interpret the term. See Sierra Club, 245 F.3d 
at 438 (“Once a species has been listed as 
endangered . . . the ESA states that the 
Secretary ‘shall’ designate a critical habitat 
‘to the maximum extent prudent or 
determinable.’ The ESA leaves to the 
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Secretary the task of defining ‘prudent’ and 
‘determinable.’” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 
1533(h))). To issue a formal rule designating 
critical habitat for the frog, the Service 
necessarily had to interpret and apply the 
applicable ESA provisions, including the 
word “essential.” See Nat'l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 
407, 420 (1992) (“[W]e defer to an 
interpretation which was a necessary 
presupposition of the [agency]’s decision.”); 
cf. S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 
581, 596 & n.13 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining 
that, when the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services are charged with 
reviewing and approving state Medicaid 
plans to ensure that the plans conform to the 
Act, the agency implicitly interprets the Act 
when granting approvals). The Service issued 
the designation as a formal agency rule after 
two rounds of notice and comment. Thus, the 
Service’s interpretation of the term 
“essential” is entitled to Chevron deference. 
See Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 665 
(applying Chevron deference in the context 
of the ESA); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44. 
 
When, as here, “an agency’s decision 
qualifies for Chevron deference, we will 
accept the agency’s reasonable construction 
of an ambiguous statute that the agency is 
charged with administering.” Knapp, 796 
F.3d at 455. The question presented, then, is 
whether the Landowners have demonstrated 
that the Service interpreted the ESA 
unreasonably when it deemed Unit 1 
“essential” for the conservation of the dusky 
gopher frog. Although the Landowners 
acknowledge that “the Service undoubtedly 
has some discretion in interpreting the 
statutory language of the ESA,” they contend 
that the Service “does not have the authority 
to apply the term ‘essential’ in a way that is 
contrary to its plain meaning.” The 
Landowners do not explain what they think 
the “plain meaning” of essential is, however, 
save to argue, circularly, that we must “insist[ 
]” that “‘essential’ must truly mean 
essential.” 
 
We consider first their argument that 
it is an unreasonable interpretation of the 
ESA to describe Unit 1 as essential for the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog when 
Unit 1 is not currently habitable by the frog. 
The statute does not support this argument. 
There is no habitability requirement in the 
text of the ESA or the implementing 
regulations. The statute requires the Service 
to designate “essential” areas, without further 
defining “essential” to mean “habitable.” See 
Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell, 790 
F.3d 977, 994 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding the 
designation of unoccupied critical habitat, 
even though the area was not habitable by the 
endangered species). The Landowners’ 
proposed extra-textual limit on the 
designation of unoccupied land—
habitability—effectively conflates the 
standard for designating unoccupied land 
with the standard for designating occupied 
land. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. 
MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015) 
(“Congress generally acts intentionally when 
it uses particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another.”). As Judge 
Feldman insightfully observed, “[their 
position] is . . . contrary to the ESA; [the 
Landowners] equate what Congress plainly 
differentiates: the ESA defines two distinct 
types of critical habitat, occupied and 
unoccupied; only occupied habitat must 
contain all of the relevant [physical or 
biological features].” Markle Interests, 40 F. 
Supp. 3d at 761. Thus, the plain text of the 
ESA does not require Unit 1 to be habitable. 
“[R]ather,” as Judge Feldman elaborated, 
“[the Service] is tasked with designating as 
critical unoccupied habitat so long as it 
determines it is ‘essential for the 
conservation of the species’ and ‘only when 
a designation limited to its present range 
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would be inadequate to ensure the 
conservation of the species.’” Id. at 762 
(quoting 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(e)). Here, the 
Service provided scientific data to support its 
finding that Unit 1 is essential, and as Judge 
Feldman held, “[the Landowners] have not 
demonstrated that [the Service’s] findings are 
implausible.” Id. Thus, the Landowners have 
not shown that the Service employed an 
unreasonable interpretation of the ESA when 
it found that the currently uninhabitable Unit 
1 was essential for the conservation of the 
dusky gopher frog and designated the land as 
critical habitat. 
 
We consider next the argument that it 
is an unreasonable interpretation of the ESA 
to describe Unit 1 as essential for the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog when 
Unit 1 “is not currently supporting the 
conservation of the species in any way and 
the Service has no reasonable basis to believe 
that it will do so at any point in the 
foreseeable future.” Like their proposed 
habitability requirement, the Landowners’ 
proposed temporal requirement— 
considering whether the frog can live on the 
land “currently” or in the “foreseeable 
future”—also lacks legal support and is 
undermined by the ESA’s text. The ESA’s 
critical-habitat provisions do not require the 
Service to know when a protected species 
will be conserved as a result of the 
designation. The Service is required to 
designate unoccupied areas as critical habitat 
if these areas are “essential for the 
conservation of the species.” 16 U.S.C. § 
1532(5)(A)(ii). The statute defines 
“conservation” as “the use of all methods and 
procedures which are necessary to bring any 
endangered species . . . to the point at which 
the measures provided . . . are no longer 
necessary.” Id. § 1532(3); cf. Alaska Oil & 
Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 555 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (“The Act is concerned with 
protecting the future of the species[.]”). 
Neither of these provisions sets a deadline for 
achieving this ultimate conservation goal. 
See Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983, 989 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that the Service need not 
determine “exactly when conservation will 
be complete” before making a critical-habitat 
designation). And the Landowners do not 
explain why it is impossible to make an 
essentiality determination without 
determining when (or whether) the 
conservation goal will be achieved. See id. 
(“A seller of sporting goods should be able to 
identify which rod and reel are essential to 
catching a largemouth bass, but is not 
expected to predict when the customer will 
catch one.”). As Judge Feldman concluded, 
“[the Service’s] failure (as yet) to identify 
how or when a viable population of dusky 
gopher frogs will be achieved, as indifferent 
and overreaching by the government as it 
appears, does not serve to invalidate its 
finding that Unit 1 was part of the minimum 
required habitat for the frog’s conservation.” 
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 762–63. 
We also note that, in contrast to the habitat-
designation provision at issue here, the 
ESA’s recovery-plan provisions do require 
the Service to estimate when a species will be 
conserved. See 16 U.S.C. § 
1533(f)(1)(B)(iii). Congress’s inclusion of a 
conservation-timeline requirement for 
recovery plans, but omission of it for critical-
habitat designations, further underscores the 
weakness of the Landowners’ argument. See 
MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 919. 
 
 Moreover, we observe that the 
Landowners’ proposed temporal requirement 
could effectively exclude all private land not 
currently occupied by the species from 
critical-habitat designations. By the 
Landowners’ logic, private landowners could 
trump the Service’s scientific determination 
that unoccupied habitat is essential for the 
conservation of a species so long as they 
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declare that they are not currently willing to 
modify habitat to make it habitable and that 
they will not be willing to make 
modifications in the foreseeable future. Their 
logic would also seem to allow landowners 
whose land is immediately habitable to block 
a critical-habitat designation merely by 
declaring that they will not—now or ever—
permit the reintroduction of the species to 
their land. The Landowners’ focus on 
private-party cooperation as part of the 
definition of “essential” finds no support in 
the text of the ESA. Nothing in the ESA 
requires that private landowners be willing to 
participate in species conservation. Summing 
up the Landowners’ arguments on this point, 
Judge Feldman observed that the 
Landowners “effectively ask the Court to 
endorse—contrary to the express terms and 
scope of the statute—a private landowner 
exemption from unoccupied critical-habitat 
designations. This, the Third Branch, is the 
wrong audience for addressing this matter of 
policy.” Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 
769 n.40. We agree. Thus, the Landowners 
have not shown that the Service employed an 
unreasonable interpretation of the ESA when 
it found that Unit 1 was essential for the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog 
without first establishing that Unit 1 currently 
supports, or in the “foreseeable future” will 
support, the conservation of the dusky gopher 
frog. 
 
We next consider the argument that 
that the Service has interpreted the word 
“essential” unreasonably because its 
interpretation fails to place “meaningful 
limits” on the Service’s power under the 
ESA. Thus, we consider whether, in 
designating Unit 1, the Service abided the 
meaningful limits that the ESA and the 
agency’s implementing regulations set on the 
Service’s authority to designate unoccupied 
areas as critical habitat. Under the regulations 
in effect at the time that Unit 1 was 
designated, the Service had to find that the 
species’s occupied habitat was inadequate 
before it could even consider designating 
unoccupied habitat as critical. 50 C.F.R. § 
424.12(e). In part, this preliminary 
determination provided a limit to the term 
“essential” as it relates to unoccupied areas. 
Unoccupied areas could be essential only if 
occupied areas were found to be inadequate 
for conserving the species. See Bear Valley 
Mut. Water Co., 790 F.3d at 994 (recognizing 
that the inadequacy and essentiality 
requirements overlap). Here, the Service 
made that threshold inadequacy 
determination—a determination that the 
Landowners do not challenge. 
 
Next, under the ESA itself, the 
Service can designate unoccupied land only 
if it is “essential for the conservation of the 
species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii). 
“Conservation” is defined as “the use of all 
methods and procedures which are necessary 
to bring any endangered species . . . to the 
point at which the measures provided . . . are 
no longer necessary.” Id. § 1532(3) 
(emphasis added). In light of this definition, 
we find implausible the Landowners’ parade 
of horribles in which they suggest that, if the 
Service can designate an area like Unit 1 as 
critical habitat, it could designate “much of 
the land in the United States” as well. They 
contend that “[b]ecause any land may 
conceivably be turned into suitable habitat 
with enough time, effort, and resources, th[e] 
[Service’s] interpretation gives the Service 
nearly limitless authority to burden private 
lands with a critical habitat designation.” But 
we find it hard to see how the Service would 
be able to satisfactorily explain why 
randomly chosen land—whether an empty 
field or, as the Landowners suggest, land 
covered in “buildings” and “pavement”—
would be any more “necessary” to a given 
species’ recovery than any other arbitrarily 
chosen empty field or paved lot. Here, the 
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Service confirmed through peer review and 
two rounds of notice and comment a 
scientific consensus as to the presence and 
rarity of a critical (and difficult to reproduce) 
feature—the ephemeral ponds—which 
justified its finding that Unit 1 was essential 
for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog. 
 
In addition, the ESA requires the 
Service to base its finding of essentiality on 
“the best scientific data available.” Id. § 
1533(b)(2). This requirement further cabins 
the Service’s power to make critical-habitat 
designations. Here, the Final Designation 
was based on the scientific expertise of the 
agency’s biologists and outside gopher frog 
specialists. If this scientific support were not 
in the record, the designation could not stand. 
But that is not the situation here, and the 
Landowners do not challenge the consensus 
scientific data on which the Service relied. 
The Landowners have not shown that the 
Service employed an interpretation of the 
ESA that is inconsistent with the meaningful 
limits that the ESA and the agency’s 
implementing regulations set on the Service’s 
authority to designate unoccupied areas as 
critical habitat. 
 
In sum, the Landowners have not 
established that the Service interpreted the 
ESA unreasonably—and was thus 
undeserving of Chevron deference—when it 
found that Unit 1 was essential for the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog. 
Likewise, the Landowners have not shown 
that the Service’s essentiality finding failed 
to “satisfy minimum standards of 
rationality,” 10 Ring Precision, 722 F.3d at 
723, which means that they have not shown 
that the Service acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously, either. 
 
Finally, the Landowners contend that 
it is improper to protect Unit 1 with a critical-
habitat designation when there are other ways 
to ensure that Unit 1 will assist with the 
conservation of the gopher frog. It is true that 
the Service could manage Unit 1 by 
purchasing the land. See 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a). 
But the legal availability of other statutory 
conservation mechanisms, some arguably 
more intrusive of private property interests, 
does not undercut the Service’s separate 
statutory duty to designate as critical habitat 
unoccupied areas that are essential for the 
conservation of the species. See id. § 
1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (“The Secretary . . . to the 
maximum extent prudent and determinable . 
. . shall . . . designate any habitat of [an 
endangered] species which is then considered 
to be critical habitat . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 
In sum, the designation of Unit 1 as 
critical habitat was not arbitrary and 
capricious nor based upon an unreasonable 
interpretation of the ESA. The Service 
reasonably determined (1) that designating 
occupied habitat alone would be inadequate 
to ensure the conservation of the dusky 
gopher frog and (2) that Unit 1 is essential for 
the conservation of the frog. We thus agree 
with Judge Feldman: “the law authorizes 
such action and . . . the government has acted 
within the law.” Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 
3d at 759–60. 
 
C. Decision Not to Exclude Unit 1 
 
In addition to attacking the Service’s 
conclusion that Unit 1 is essential for the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog, the 
Landowners also challenge the Service’s 
conclusion that the economic impacts on Unit 
1 are not disproportionate. See Final 
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,141. The 
Landowners argue that because the benefits 
of excluding Unit 1 from the designation 
clearly outweigh the benefits of including it 
in the designation, the Service’s decision is 
arbitrary and capricious. The Landowners 
contend that because Unit 1 is not currently 
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habitable by the dusky gopher frog, the land 
provides no biological benefit to the frog. 
They emphasize that Unit 1, by contrast, 
bears a potential loss of development value of 
up to $33.9 million over twenty years. 
 
 The ESA mandates that the Service 
“tak[e] into consideration the economic 
impact . . . of specifying any particular area 
as critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
After it takes this impact into consideration, 
the Service  
 
may exclude any area from critical 
habitat if [it] determines that the 
benefits of such exclusion outweigh 
the benefits of specifying such area as 
part of the critical habitat, unless [it] 
determines, based on the best 
scientific and commercial data 
available, that the failure to designate 
such area as critical habitat will result 
in the extinction of the species 
concerned. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). The Service argues that 
once it has fulfilled its statutory obligation to 
consider economic impacts, a decision to not 
exclude an area is discretionary and thus not 
reviewable in court. The Service is correct. 
Under the APA, decisions “committed to 
agency discretion by law” are not reviewable 
in federal court. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). An 
action is committed to agency discretion 
when there is “no meaningful standard 
against which to judge the agency’s exercise 
of discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 830 (1985). “[I]f no judicially 
manageable standards are available for 
judging how and when an agency should 
exercise its discretion, then it is impossible to 
evaluate agency action for ‘abuse of 
discretion.’” Id. 
 
The only other circuit court that has 
confronted this issue has recognized that 
there are no manageable standards for 
reviewing the Service’s decision not to 
exercise its discretionary authority to exclude 
an area from a critical-habitat designation. 
See Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 790 F.3d at 
989–90. It therefore held that the decision not 
to exclude is unreviewable. Id.; see also Bldg. 
Indus. Ass’n of Bay Area v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, No. 13-15132, 2015 WL 
4080761, at *7–8 (9th Cir. July 7, 2015), aff’g 
No. C 11-4118, 2012 WL 6002511 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 30, 2012). Similarly, every district 
court that has addressed this issue has also 
held that the decision not to exclude is not 
subject to judicial review. See Aina Nui Corp. 
v. Jewell, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1132 n.4 (D. 
Haw. 2014) (“The Court does not review the 
Service’s ultimate decision not to exclude . . 
. , which is committed to the agency’s 
discretion.”); Cape Hatteras Access Pres. 
Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 731 F. 
Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The plain 
reading of the statute fails to provide a 
standard by which to judge the Service’s 
decision not to exclude an area from critical 
habitat.”); Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S-05- 
0629, 2006 WL 3190518, at *20 (E.D. Cal. 
Nov. 2, 2006) (“[T]he court has no 
substantive standards by which to review the 
[agency’s] decisions not to exclude certain 
tracts based on economic or other 
considerations, and those decisions are 
therefore committed to agency discretion.”) 
 
We see no reason to chart a new path 
on this issue in concluding that we cannot 
review the Service’s decision not to exercise 
its discretion to exclude Unit 1 from the 
critical-habitat designation. Section 
1533(b)(2) articulates a standard for 
reviewing the Service’s decision to exclude 
an area. But the statute is silent on a standard 
for reviewing the Service’s decision to not 
exclude an area. Put another way, the section 
establishes a discretionary process by which 
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the Service may exclude areas from 
designation, but it does not articulate any 
standard governing when the Service must 
exclude an area from designation. See Bear 
Valley Mut. Water Co., 790 F.3d at 989 
(“[W]here a statute is written in the 
permissive, an agency’s decision not to act is 
considered presumptively unreviewable 
because courts lack ‘a focus for judicial 
review . . . to determine whether the agency 
exceeded its statutory powers.’” (quoting 
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832)). Thus, even were 
we to assume that the Landowners are correct 
that the economic benefits of exclusion 
outweigh the conservation benefits of 
designation, the Service is still not obligated 
to exclude Unit 1. That decision is committed 
to the agency’s discretion and is not 
reviewable. 
 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015), 
does not compel a contrary conclusion. In 
Michigan, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) had interpreted a provision 
of the Clean Air Act to not require the 
consideration of costs when deciding whether 
to regulate hazardous emissions from power 
plants. Id. at 2706. Although the Supreme 
Court held that the EPA misinterpreted the 
statute, the Court emphasized that it was not 
requiring the agency “to conduct a formal 
cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage 
and disadvantage is assigned a monetary 
value.” Id. at 2711. The Court further 
explained that “[i]t will be up to the Agency 
to decide (as always, within the limits of 
reasonable interpretation) how to account for 
cost.” Id. 
 
Unlike the provision of the Clean Air 
Act at issue in Michigan, the ESA explicitly 
mandates “consideration” of “economic 
impact.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2); see Bennett, 
520 U.S. at 172. The Service fulfilled this 
requirement by commissioning an economic 
report by Industrial Economics, Inc. That 
analysis estimated the economic impact on 
Unit 1, and to further refine that analysis, it 
included three impact scenarios. The report 
noted that Unit 1 bears a potential loss of 
development value ranging from $0 to $33.9 
million over twenty years. See Final 
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,140–41; This 
potential loss depends on a number of 
contingencies that may or may not arise, 
including future development projects, the 
nature of federal agency approval that is 
required for those projects, and possible 
limits that are imposed after any consultation 
that accompanies federal agency action. As 
has been recently recognized, the statute does 
not require a particular methodology for 
considering economic impact. See Bldg. 
Indus. Ass’n of Bay Area, 2015 WL 4080761, 
at *5–6. And here on appeal, the Landowners 
do not challenge the methodology that the 
Service used when analyzing the economic 
impact on Unit 1; instead, the Landowners 
challenge the Service’s bottom-line 
conclusion not to exclude Unit 1 on the basis 
of that economic impact. That conclusion is 
not reviewable. 
 
II. Commerce Clause 
 
Having concluded that the Service’s 
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat was 
not arbitrary and capricious, we must next 
consider the Landowners’ alternative 
argument that the ESA exceeds Congress’s 
powers under the Commerce Clause. The 
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power 
“[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court 
defined three broad categories of federal 
legislation that are consistent with this power. 
514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). This case concerns 
the third Lopez category—that is, whether the 
federal action “substantially affect[s] 
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interstate commerce.” Id. at 558–59 (citations 
omitted). 
 
The Landowners concede that, 
“properly limited and confined to the 
statutory definition,” the critical-habitat 
provision of the ESA is a constitutional 
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority. They maintain, however, that the 
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat for the 
dusky gopher frog exceeds the scope of an 
otherwise constitutional power. Viewed this 
narrowly, the designation of Unit 1 is 
intrastate (not interstate) activity. The 
Landowners further argue that “[t]here is 
simply no rational basis to conclude that the 
use of Unit 1 will substantially affect 
interstate commerce.” In support of this 
narrow framing of the issue, the Landowners 
imply that it is inappropriate to aggregate the 
effect of designating Unit 1 with the effect of 
all other critical-habitat designations 
nationwide. Instead, the Landowners argue 
that we should analyze the commercial 
impact of the Unit 1 designation independent 
of all other designations. But as Judge 
Feldman explained, “each application of the 
ESA is not itself subject to the same tests for 
determining whether the underlying statute is 
a constitutional exercise of the Commerce 
Clause.” Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 
758. We agree with Judge Feldman that “the 
[Landowners’] constitutional claim is 
foreclosed by binding precedent.” Id. 
 
The Supreme Court has outlined four 
considerations that are relevant when 
analyzing whether Congress can regulate 
purely intrastate activities under the third 
Lopez prong. See United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 609– 12 (2000). First, courts 
should consider whether the intrastate 
activity “in question has been some sort of 
economic endeavor.” Id. at 611. Second, 
courts should consider whether there is an 
“express jurisdictional element” in the statute 
that might limit its application to instances 
that “have an explicit connection with or 
effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 611–12. 
The next consideration that should inform the 
analysis is legislative history and 
congressional findings on the effect that the 
subject of the legislation has on interstate 
commerce. Id. at 612. Finally, courts should 
evaluate whether the link between the 
intrastate activity and its effect on interstate 
commerce is attenuated. Id. The 
Landowners’ constitutional challenge can be 
distilled to the question of whether we can 
properly analyze the Unit 1 designation 
aggregated with all other critical-habitat 
designations nationwide. This question falls 
under the first consideration articulated in 
Morrison. Because the Landowners concede 
that the critical-habitat provision of the ESA 
is “within the legitimate powers of 
Congress,” we need focus on only the first 
consideration if we find that aggregation is 
appropriate. 
 
The first consideration is whether the 
regulated intrastate activity is economic or 
commercial in nature. Id. at 611. The 
question thus arises: what is the regulated 
activity that we must analyze? See GDF 
Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 
633 (5th Cir. 2003). In GDF Realty, where 
we examined the “take” provision of the 
ESA, we emphasized that we had to analyze 
the regulation of endangered species takes, 
not the commercial motivations of the 
plaintiff–developers who were challenging 
the statute. Id. at 636. Applying GDF Realty 
here, the regulated activity in question is the 
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat, not 
the Landowners’ long-term development 
plans. 
 
The next issue is whether the 
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat is 
economic or commercial in nature. 
“[W]hether an activity is economic or 
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commercial is to be given a broad reading in 
this context.” Id. at 638. In certain cases, an 
intrastate activity may have a direct 
relationship to commerce and therefore the 
intrastate activity alone may substantially 
affect interstate commerce. Alternatively, 
“the regulation can reach intrastate 
commercial activity that by itself is too trivial 
to have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce but which, when aggregated with 
similar and related activity, can substantially 
affect interstate commerce.” United States v. 
Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 599 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 
The designation of Unit 1 alone may 
not have a direct relationship to commerce, 
but under the aggregation principle, the 
designation of Unit 1 survives constitutional 
muster. Under this principle, the intrastate 
activity can be regulated if it is “an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity, in which the regulatory scheme 
could be undercut unless the intrastate 
activity were regulated.” Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (quoting Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 561). Thus, there are two factors we 
must consider: (1) whether the provision 
mandating the designation of critical habitat 
is part of an economic regulatory scheme, and 
(2) whether designation is essential to that 
scheme.  
 
 We have already concluded that the 
ESA is an economic regulatory scheme. See 
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639 (“ESA’s 
protection of endangered species is economic 
in nature.”); id. at 640 (“ESA is an economic 
regulatory scheme . . . .”). Congress enacted 
the ESA to curb species extinction “as a 
consequence of economic growth and 
development untempered by adequate 
concern and conservation.” 16 U.S.C. § 
1531(a)(1). Because the ESA’s drafters 
sought to protect the “incalculable” value of 
biodiversity, the ESA prohibits interstate and 
foreign commerce in endangered species. See 
id. § 1538(a)(1)(E)–(F); GDF Realty, 326 
F.3d at 639 (citation omitted). Finally, habitat 
protection and management—which often 
intersect with commercial development—
underscore the economic nature of the ESA 
and its critical-habitat provision. See 16 
U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(A) (requiring that the 
Secretary prioritize implementing recovery 
plans for “those species that are, or may be, 
in conflict with construction or other 
development projects or other forms of 
economic activity”); see also id. § 
1533(a)(1)(B) (listing the “overutilization [of 
a species] for commercial . . . purposes” as 
one of the factors endangering or threatening 
species). 
 
But it is not sufficient that the ESA is 
an economic regulatory scheme. The critical-
habitat provision must also be an essential 
component of the ESA. If the process of 
designating critical habitat is “an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity,” then whether that process—
designation— “ensnares some purely 
intrastate activity is of no moment.” Raich, 
545 U.S. at 22. “[T]he de minimis character 
of individual instances arising under that 
statute is of no consequence.” Id. at 17 
(citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). When Congress has regulated a 
class of activities, we “have no power to 
excise, as trivial, individual instances of the 
class.” Id. at 23 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). We conclude that 
designating critical habitat is an essential part 
of the ESA’s economic regulatory scheme. 
 
This conclusion is consistent with our 
analysis of the ESA’s “take” provision in 
GDF Realty. There, we held that “takes” of 
an endangered species that lived only in 
Texas could be aggregated with takes of other 
endangered species nationwide to survive a 
Commerce Clause challenge. GDF Realty, 
326 F.3d at 640–41. That case concerned the 
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Service’s regulation of takes of six 
subterranean endangered species (“the Cave 
Species”) located solely in two counties in 
Texas. Id. at 625. Similar to the Landowners 
here, the owners of some of the land under 
which these species lived wanted to develop 
the land into a commercial and residential 
area; they sued the government, claiming that 
the take provision of the ESA, as applied to 
the Cave Species, exceeded the boundaries of 
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 624, 626. 
Addressing this claim, we upheld the take 
provision. We explained that, in the 
aggregate, takes of all endangered species 
have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. See id. at 638–40. Because of the 
“interdependence of [all] species,” we held 
that regulating the takes of the Cave Species 
was an essential part of the larger regulatory 
scheme of the ESA, in that, without this 
regulation, the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut by piecemeal extinctions. Id. at 
639–40. Every other circuit court that has 
addressed similar challenges has also upheld 
the ESA as a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power. See Gibbs v. 
Babbitt, 214 F.3d 214 F.3d 483, 497–98 (4th 
Cir. 2000); San Luis & Delta–Mendota 
Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1177 
(9th Cir. 2011); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Interior, 442 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 
2006) (per curiam), aff’g 360 F. Supp. 2d 
1214, 1240 (D. Wyo. 2005); Ala.–Tombigbee 
Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 
1274 (11th Cir. 2007); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. 
Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. 
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1049–57 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). The Landowners have not identified 
any federal court of appeals that has held 
otherwise. 
 
This caselaw compels the same 
conclusion here. For one, we see no basis to 
distinguish the ESA’s prohibition on “takes” 
from the ESA’s mandate to designate critical 
habitat. As Congress recognized, one of the 
primary factors causing a species to become 
endangered is “the present or threatened 
destruction, modification, or curtailment of 
its habitat or range.” 16 U.S.C. § 
1533(a)(1)(A). Because of the link between 
species survival and habitat preservation, the 
statute imposes a mandatory duty on the 
Service to designate critical habitat for 
endangered species “to the maximum extent 
prudent and determinable.” Id. § 
1533(a)(3)(A). Indeed, the ESA includes an 
express purpose of conserving “the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species . 
. . depend.” Id. § 1531(b); see also GDF 
Realty, 326 F.3d at 640 (“In fact, according 
to Congress, the ‘essential purpose’ of the 
ESA is ‘to protect the ecosystems upon which 
we and other species depend.’” (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 93–412, at 10)). Allowing a 
particular critical habitat—one that the 
Service has already found to be essential for 
the conservation of the species—to escape 
designation would undercut the ESA’s 
scheme by leading to piecemeal destruction 
of critical habitat. We therefore conclude that 
the critical-habitat provision is an essential 
part of the ESA, without which the ESA’s 
regulatory scheme would be undercut. Cf. 
Ala.–Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 
1274 (holding that “the ‘comprehensive 
scheme’ of species protection contained in 
the Endangered Species Act has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce” and that the 
process of listing species as endangered or 
threatened is “an essential part of that larger 
regulation of economic activity” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Given this conclusion, the 
designation of Unit 1 may be aggregated with 
all other critical-habitat designations. As 
Judge Feldman correctly observed, “[w]here 
the class of activities is regulated and that 
class is within the reach of federal power, the 
courts have no power to excise, as trivial, 
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individual instances of the class.” Markle 
Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 23) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen 
a general regulatory statute bears a 
substantial relation to commerce, the de 
minimis character of individual instances 
arising under that statute is of no 
consequence.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 
(citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). We therefore will not look at the 
designation of Unit 1 in isolation, but instead 
we consider it aggregated with all other 
critical-habitat designations. Judge Feldman 
reached the same conclusion, explaining that, 
“[a]ggregating the regulation of activities that 
adversely modify the frog’s critical 
habitat”—including the isolated designation 
of Unit 1—“with the regulation of activities 
that affect other listed species’ habitat, the 
designation of critical habitat by the [Service] 
is a constitutionally valid application of a 
constitutionally valid Commerce Clause 
regulatory scheme.” Markle Interests, 40 F. 
Supp. 3d at 759. Because the Landowners 
concede that the criticalhabitat provision of 
the ESA is a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority, we can likewise 
conclude that the application of the ESA’s 
criticalhabitat provision to Unit 1 is a 
constitutional exercise of the Commerce 
Clause power. 
 
III. National Environmental Policy 
Act 
 
 Finally, the Landowners contend that 
the Service violated NEPA by failing to 
prepare an environmental impact statement 
before designating Unit 1 as critical habitat. 
If proposed federal action will “significantly 
affect[ ] the quality of the human 
environment,” NEPA requires the relevant 
federal agency to provide an environmental 
impact statement for the proposed action. 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). In Sabine River 
Authority, we explained that an 
environmental impact statement “is not 
required for non major action or a major 
action which does not have significant impact 
on the environment.” 951 F.2d at 677 
(citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). This standard necessarily means 
that if federal action will not result in any 
change to the environment, then the action 
does not trigger NEPA’s impact-statement 
requirement. See id. at 679 (noting that 
federal action “did not effectuate any change 
to the environment which would otherwise 
trigger the need to prepare an [environmental 
impact statement]”); see also Metro. Edison 
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 
U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (explaining that no 
environmental impact statement is required if 
health damage stemming from federal action 
“would not be proximately related to a 
change in the physical environment”); City of 
Dallas, Tex. v. Hall, 562 F.3d 712, 723 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that an environmental 
impact statement was not required when the 
federal action “[did] not effect a change in the 
use or character of land or in the physical 
environment”). 
 
Judge Feldman correctly held that the 
designation of Unit 1 does not trigger 
NEPA’s impact-statement requirement 
because the designation “does not effect 
changes to the physical environment.” 
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 768. The 
designation also does not require the 
Landowners to take action as a result of the 
designation. As Judge Feldman correctly 
observed, “the ESA statutory scheme makes 
clear that [the Service] has no authority to 
force private landowners to maintain or 
improve the habitat existing on their land.” 
Id. (footnote and citation omitted). We agree 
that the Service was not required to complete 
an environmental impact statement before 
designating Unit 1 as critical habitat for the 
dusky gopher frog. 
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Alternatively, this claim is resolved 
on the threshold issue of the Landowners’ 
standing to raise this NEPA claim. A plaintiff 
bringing a claim under NEPA must not only 
have Article III standing to pursue the claim, 
but also fall within the zone of interests 
sought to be protected under the statute. See 
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 
883 (1990); Sabine River Auth., 951 F.2d at 
675 (recognizing that the zone-of-interests 
test applies to challenges under NEPA). 
Other circuit courts have held that “a plaintiff 
who asserts purely economic injuries does 
not have standing to challenge an agency 
action under NEPA.” Nev. Land Action Ass’n 
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 
1993) (citing cases from the Fourth, Eighth, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits). Consistent with 
this conclusion, we have observed in dicta 
that a “disappointed contractor” who was 
injured by an easement that prevented 
development opportunities would not have 
standing under the zone-of-interests test 
because “NEPA was not designed to protect 
contractors’ rights: it was designed to protect 
the environment.” Sabine River Auth., 951 
F.2d at 676. The Landowners’ asserted 
injuries here are similarly economic, not 
environmental: lost future development and 
lost property value. These economic injuries 
do not fall within the zone of interests 
protected by NEPA, and the Landowners 
therefore lack standing to sue to enforce 
NEPA’s impact-statement requirement.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we 
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
 
PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge, 
dissenting: 
 
 There is a gap in the reasoning of the 
majority opinion that cannot be bridged. The 
area at issue is not presently “essential for the 
conservation of the [endangered] species” 
because it plays no part in the conservation of 
that species. Its biological and physical 
characteristics will not support a dusky 
gopher frog population. There is no evidence 
of a reasonable probability (or any 
probability for that matter) that it will become 
“essential” to the conservation of the species 
because there is no evidence that the 
substantial alterations and maintenance 
necessary to transform the area into habitat 
suitable for the endangered species will, or 
are likely to, occur. Land that is not 
“essential” for conservation does not meet 
the statutory criteria for “critical habitat.” 
 
The majority opinion interprets the 
Endangered Species Act to allow the 
Government to impose restrictions on private 
land use even though the land: is not occupied 
by the endangered species and has not been 
for more than fifty years; is not near areas 
inhabited by the species; cannot sustain the 
species without substantial alterations and 
future annual maintenance, neither of which 
the Government has the authority to 
effectuate, as it concedes; and does not play 
any supporting role in the existence of current 
habitat for the species. If the Endangered 
Species Act permitted the actions taken by 
the Government in this case, then vast 
portions of the United States could be 
designated as “critical habitat” because it is 
theoretically possible, even if not probable, 
that land could be modified to sustain the 
introduction or reintroduction of an 
endangered species.  
 
The majority opinion upholds the 
governmental action here on nothing more 
than the Government’s hope or speculation 
that the landowners and lessors of the 1,544 
acres at issue will pay for removal of the 
currently existing pine trees used in 
commercial timber operations and replace 
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them with another tree variety suitable for 
dusky gopher frog habitat, and perform other 
modifications as well as future annual 
maintenance, that might then support the 
species if, with the landowners’ cooperation, 
it is reintroduced to the area. The language of 
the Endangered Species Act does not permit 
such an expansive interpretation and 
consequent overreach by the Government.  
 
Undoubtedly, the ephemeral ponds on 
the property at issue are somewhat rare. But 
it is undisputed that the ponds cannot 
themselves sustain a dusky gopher frog 
population. It is only with significant 
transformation and then, annual 
maintenance, each dependent on the assent 
and financial contribution of private 
landowners, that the area, including the 
ponds, might play a role in conservation. The 
Endangered Species Act does not permit the 
Government to designate an area as “critical 
habitat,” and therefore use that designation as 
leverage against the landowners, based on 
one feature of an area when that one feature 
cannot support the existence of the species 
and significant alterations to the area as a 
whole would be required. 
 
The majority opinion’s holding is 
unprecedented and sweeping. 
 
I 
 
A Final Rule of the United States Fish 
and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) 
designated 12 units of land encompassing 
6,477 acres as “critical habitat”5 for the 
dusky gopher frog. Eleven of those units, 
totaling 4,933 acres, are in four counties in 
Mississippi, and they are not at issue in this 
appeal. It is only the owners and lessors of the 
twelfth unit, comprised of 1,544 acres in 
Louisiana and denominated Unit 1 by the 
Service, that have appealed the designation. 
The dusky gopher frog species was last seen 
in Louisiana in 1965 in one small pond 
located on Unit 1. 
 
The Service specifically found in its 
Final Rule that Unit 1 contains only one of 
the physical or biological features and habitat 
characteristics required to sustain the species’ 
life-history processes. That characteristic is 
the existence of five ephemeral ponds on the 
Louisiana property. The Service 
acknowledged that the other necessary 
characteristics were lacking, finding, among 
its other conclusions, that “the surrounding 
uplands are poor-quality terrestrial habitat for 
dusky gopher frogs.” While the Service was 
of the opinion that “[a]lthough the uplands 
associated with the ponds do not currently 
contain the essential physical or biological 
features of critical habitat, we believe them to 
be restorable with reasonable effort” to 
permit habitation, the Service candidly 
recognized in the Final Rule that it could not 
undertake any efforts to change the current 
features of the land or to move frogs onto the 
land without the permission and cooperation 
of the owners of the land. It cited no 
evidence, and there is none, that “reasonable 
efforts” would in fact be made to restore “the 
essential physical or biological features of 
critical habitat” on Unit 1. The Service cited 
only its “hope” that such alterations would be 
taken by the landowners.  
 
In particular, the Service found that 
an open-canopied longleaf pine ecosystem is 
necessary for the habitat of this species of 
frog. Approximately ninety percent of the 
property is currently covered with closed-
canopy loblolly pine plantations. These trees 
would have to be removed or burned and then 
replaced with another tree variety to allow the 
establishment of the habitat that the Service 
has concluded is necessary for the breeding 
and sustaining of a dusky gopher frog 
population. It is undisputed that the land is 
subject to a timber lease until 2043, timber 
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operations are ongoing, and neither the owner 
of the property nor the timber lessee is willing 
to permit the substantial alterations that the 
Service concluded would be necessary to 
restore the potentiality of the ponds and 
surrounding area as habitat for this species of 
frog. 
 
II 
 
Review of the Service’s decisions 
under the Endangered Species Act is 
governed by the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA). The Service’s designation of the 
land at issue as “critical habitat” was “not in 
accordance with law” and was “in excess of 
statutory . . . authority” within the meaning of 
the APA.  
 
The Endangered Species Act defines 
“critical habitat” as:  
 
(i) the specific areas within the 
geographical area occupied by the 
species, at the time it is listed in 
accordance with the provisions of 
section 1533 of this title, on which are 
found those physical or biological 
features (I) essential to the 
conservation of the species and (II) 
which may require special 
management considerations or 
protection; and  
 
(ii) specific areas outside the 
geographical area occupied by the 
species at the time it is listed in 
accordance with the provisions of 
section 1533 of this title, upon a 
determination by the Secretary that 
such areas are essential for the 
conservation of the species. 
 
The Final Rule reflects that “Unit 1 is 
not currently occupied nor was it occupied at 
the time the dusky gopher frog was listed [as 
an endangered species].” Accordingly, the 
authority of the Service to designate this area 
as “critical habitat” is governed by subsection 
(ii). The statute requires that Unit 1 must be 
“essential for the conservation of the species” 
or else it cannot be designated as “critical 
habitat.” 
 
The word “essential” means more 
than desirable. Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “essential” as “2. Of the utmost 
importance; basic and necessary. 3. Having 
real existence, actual.” The Service’s 
conclusion that Unit 1 is “essential” for the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog 
contravenes these definitions. Unit 1 is not 
“actual[ly]” playing any part in the 
conservation of the endangered frog species. 
Nor is land “basic and necessary” for the 
conservation of a species when it cannot 
support the existence of the endangered 
species unless the physical characteristics of 
the land are significantly modified. This is 
particularly the case when the Government is 
powerless to effectuate the desired 
transformation unless it takes (condemns) the 
property and funds these efforts. There is no 
evidence that the modifications and 
maintenance necessary to transform Unit 1 
into habitat will be undertaken by anyone.  
 
The Government’s, and the majority 
opinion’s, interpretation of “essential” means 
that virtually any part of the United States 
could be designated as “critical habitat” for 
any given endangered species so long as the 
property could be modified in a way that 
would support introduction and subsequent 
conservation of the species on it. This is not 
a reasonable construction of § 1532(5)(A)(2).  
 
We are not presented with a case in 
which land, though unoccupied by an 
endangered species, provides elements to 
neighboring or downstream property that are 
essential to the survival of the species in the 
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areas that it does occupy. For example, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that certain areas, 
though unoccupied, were “essential” to an 
endangered species (the Santa Ana sucker, a 
small fish) because the designated areas were 
“the primary sources of high quality coarse 
sediment for the downstream occupied 
portions of the Santa Ana River,” and that 
“coarse sediment was essential to the sucker 
because [it] provided a spawning ground as 
well as a feeding ground from which the 
sucker obtained algae, insects, and detritus.” 
In the present case, Unit 1 does not support, 
in any way, the existence of the dusky gopher 
frog or its habitat. Our analysis therefore 
concerns only whether the property is 
“essential for the conservation of the species” 
as an area that might be capable of occupation 
by the dusky gopher frog if the area were 
physically altered. 
 
The majority opinion cites the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision regarding the Santa Ana 
sucker as support for the majority opinion’s 
assertion that “[t]here is no habitability 
requirement in the text of the ESA or the 
implementing regulations. The statute 
requires the Service to designate ‘essential’ 
areas, without further defining ‘essential’ to 
mean ‘habitable.’” I agree with that 
statement—up to a point. Land can be 
“essential” even though uninhabitable if it 
provides elements to the species’ habitat that 
are essential to sustain it, as was the case 
regarding the Santa Ana sucker. The majority 
opinion says instead that land can be 
designated as “critical habitat” even if it is not 
habitable and does not play any role in 
sustaining the species. The Ninth Circuit did 
not announce such a sweeping interpretation 
of the Endangered Species Act. That court 
held only that land not occupied by the 
species could constitute critical habitat 
because of the “essential” role it played in the 
survival of species as the primary source of 
sediment necessary for the spawning of the 
species. The majority opinion has not cited 
any decision from the Supreme Court or a 
Court of Appeals which has construed the 
Endangered Species Act to allow designation 
of land that is unoccupied by the species, 
cannot be occupied by the species unless the 
land is significantly altered, and does not play 
any supporting role in sustaining habitat for 
the species.  
 
The meaning of the word “essential” 
undoubtedly vests the Service with 
significant discretion in determining if an 
area is “essential” to the conservation of a 
species, but there are limits to a word’s 
meaning and hence the Service’s discretion. 
The Service’s interpretation of “essential for 
the conservation of the species” in the present 
case goes beyond the boundaries of what 
“essential” can reasonably be interpreted to 
mean. As the Supreme Court has explained, 
“an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not 
entitled to deference when it goes beyond the 
meaning that the statute can bear.” 
 
In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 
AT&T Co., 23 U.S.C. § 203(a) required long-
distance communications common carriers to 
file tariffs with the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC). The FCC was 
authorized under 23 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) to 
“‘modify any requirement made by or under 
the authority of this section either in 
particular instances or by general order 
applicable to special circumstances or 
conditions.’” In a rulemaking proceeding, the 
FCC made rate tariff filings optional for all 
non-dominant longdistance carriers.27 In 
subsequent proceedings, AT&T challenged 
the FCC’s statutory authority to do so, and 
the FCC took the position that its authority 
was derived from the “modify any 
requirement” provision in § 203(b). The 
Supreme Court determined that “modify” 
“connotes moderate change,” and examined 
extensively other provisions of the 
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Communications Act. The Supreme Court 
concluded that eliminating tariff rate filings 
for a segment of the industry was “much too 
extensive to be considered a ‘modification.’” 
The Court observed, “[w]hat we have here, in 
reality, is a fundamental revision of the 
statute, changing it from a scheme of rate 
regulation in long-distance common-carrier 
communications to a scheme of rate 
regulation only where effective competition 
does not exist. That may be a good idea, but 
it was not the idea Congress enacted into law 
in 1934.” The same can be said of the 
Service’s, and the majority opinion’s, 
construction of the Endangered Species Act 
in the present case. It may be a good idea to 
permit the Service to designate any land as 
“critical habitat” if it is theoretically possible 
to transform land that is uninhabitable into an 
area that could become habitat. But that is not 
what Congress did. 
 
The District of Columbia Circuit 
Court held in Southwestern Bell Corp. v. 
FCC that an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute is not entitled to deference when that 
interpretation “‘goes beyond the meaning 
that the statute can bear.’” That court was 
fully cognizant of Chevron’s teaching that 
“‘if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.’” In Southwestern Bell, the FCC 
contended that because the term “schedules” 
was not defined in the Federal 
Communications Act, the FCC could permit 
carriers to file ranges of rates rather than 
specific rates. The District of Columbia 
Circuit disagreed, concluding that “[s]ection 
203(a) . . . lays out what kind of filing the 
statute requires: ‘schedules showing all 
charges.’ This language connotes a specific 
list of discernable rates; it does not admit the 
concept of ranges.” 
 
The majority opinion says that MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. is distinguishable 
because in that case, the agency’s 
interpretation of “modify” “flatly 
contradicted the definition provided by 
‘virtually every dictionary [the Court] was 
aware of.’” The majority opinion then 
observes that one definition of “essential” is 
“of the utmost importance; basic and 
necessary,” and concludes that this definition 
“describes well a close system of ephemeral 
ponds, per the scientific consensus that the 
Service relied upon.” This highlights the 
opinion’s misdirected focus and frames the 
question that is at the heart of this case. That 
question is whether the Endangered Species 
Act permits the Service to designate land as 
critical habitat when the land has only one 
physical or biological feature that would be 
necessary to support a population of the 
endangered species but lacks the other 
primary physical or biological features that 
are also necessary for habitat. It is undisputed 
that ephemeral ponds alone cannot support a 
dusky gopher frog population. All likewise 
agree that Unit 1 lacks the other two primary 
constituent elements, which are upland 
forested nonbreeding habitat dominated by 
longleaf pine maintained by fires, and upland 
habitat between breeding and nonbreeding 
habitat with specific characteristics including 
an open canopy, native herbaceous species, 
and subservice structures. Unit 1 is not 
“essential [i.e., of the utmost importance; 
basic and necessary] for the conservation of 
the species” because it cannot serve as habitat 
unless the forests in the areas upland from the 
ponds are destroyed and the requisite 
vegetation (including a new forest) is planted 
and maintained. Because there is no 
reasonable probability that Unit 1 will be 
altered in this way, it is not “essential.” 
 
The Service’s implicit construction of 
the meaning of “essential for the 
conservation of the species” is not entitled to 
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deference because it exceeds the boundaries 
of the latitude given to an agency in 
construing a statute to which Chevron 
deference is applicable. The term “essential” 
cannot reasonably be construed to encompass 
land that is not in fact “essential for the 
conservation of the species.” When the only 
possible basis for designating an area as 
“critical habitat” is its potential use as actual 
habitat, an area cannot be “essential for the 
conservation of the species” if it is 
uninhabitable by the species and there is no 
reasonable probability that it will become 
habitable by the species. Even if scientists 
agree that an area could be modified to 
sustain a species, there must be some basis 
for concluding that it is likely that the area 
will be so modified. Otherwise, the area 
could not and will not be used for 
conservation of the species and therefore 
cannot be “essential” to the conservation of 
the species. 
 
With great respect, at other junctures, 
the majority opinion misdirects the inquiry as 
to the proper meaning of “essential for the 
conservation of the species.” The opinion 
examines an irrelevant question in arguing 
that there is no “temporal requirement” in the 
text of the Endangered Species Act. For 
example, the opinion states that the Service is 
not required “to know when a protected 
species will be conserved as a result of a 
designation.” Similarly, the majority opinion 
observes that the Act does not “set[] a 
deadline for achieving this ultimate 
conservation goal.” I agree. The Act does not 
require the Service to speculate whether or 
when an endangered species will no longer 
require conservation efforts at the time the 
Service designates “critical habitat.” But in 
designating an area as “critical habitat,” the 
question is not when the species will be 
conserved, which is the question that the 
majority opinion raises and then dismisses. 
Nor is it a question of when the area will be 
essential. Rather, the pertinent inquiry is 
whether the area is essential for conservation. 
An area cannot be essential for use as habitat 
if it is uninhabitable and there is no 
reasonable probability that it could actually 
be used for conservation. 
 
The majority opinion fails to discern 
the meaningful boundary that the term 
“essential” places on the Service in 
designating “critical habitat.” The opinion 
fails to appreciate the distinction between 
land that, because of its physical and 
biological features, cannot be used for 
conservation without significant alteration 
and land that is actually habitable but not 
occupied by the species. The majority 
opinion posits that “[the Landowners’ logic] 
would also seem to allow landowners whose 
land is immediately habitable to block a 
critical-habitat designation merely by 
declaring that they will not—now or ever—
permit the reintroduction of the species to 
their land.” The fact that a landowner is 
unwilling to permit the reintroduction of a 
species does not have a bearing on whether 
the physical and biological features of the 
land make it suitable as habitat. Land that is 
habitable but unoccupied by the species may 
be “essential” if the areas that a species 
currently occupies are inadequate for its 
survival. Even if the landowner asserts that it 
will not allow introduction of the species, the 
Service may designate the land as “critical 
habitat” because it is in fact habitable, and the 
consultation and permitting provisions of the 
Act may be used to attempt to persuade the 
owner to not destroy the features that make 
the area habitable and to allow the species to 
be reintroduced. However, when land would 
have to be significantly modified to either 
serve as habitat or to serve as a source of 
something necessary to another area that is 
habitat (such as the sediment in the Santa Ana 
sucker case), then whether there is a 
probability that the land will be so modified 
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must be part of the equation of whether the 
area is “essential.” Unless the land is 
modified, it is useless to the species and 
therefore cannot be “essential.” Under such 
circumstances, the Service cannot designate 
land as “critical habitat” unless there is an 
objective basis for concluding that 
modifications will occur because otherwise, 
the land cannot play a role in the species’ 
survival.  
 
The majority opinion rejects the 
logical limits of the word “essential” in 
concluding that requiring either actual use for 
conservation or a reasonable probability of 
use for conservation to satisfy the “essential 
for the conservation of the species” 
requirement in the statute would be reliant on 
the subjective intentions of landowners. 
Whether there is a reasonable probability that 
land will be modified so that it is suitable as 
habitat is an objective inquiry that would 
consider many factors. Those factors might 
well (and in most instances probably would) 
include economic considerations such as the 
values of various uses of the land. The 
inquiry would be whether a reasonable 
landowner would be likely to undertake the 
necessary modifications. In some cases, a 
landowner might have entered into an 
agreement to modify land so that it may be 
used as habitat, and in such a case, there 
would be nothing “subjective” in concluding 
that it is reasonably probable that the land 
will actually be used as habitat and therefore 
“essential” for the conservation of the 
species.  
 
The majority opinion’s interpretation 
of the Endangered Species Act is illogical, 
inconsistent, and depends entirely on adding 
words to the Act that are not there. Those 
words are “a critical feature.” On one hand, 
the majority opinion says that “we find it hard 
to see how the Service would be able to 
satisfactorily explain” the designation of an 
empty field as habitat.” Yet, in the next 
paragraph, the opinion says that because the 
designation in this case “was based on the 
scientific expertise of the agency’s biologists 
and outside gopher frog specialists,” this 
court is required to affirm the “critical 
habitat” designation. It is easily conceivable 
that “the best scientific data available” would 
lead scientists to conclude that an empty field 
that is not currently habitable could be altered 
to become habitat for an endangered species. 
 
Apparently recognizing that unless 
cabined in some way, the majority opinion’s 
holding would give the Service unfettered 
discretion to designate land as “critical 
habitat” so long as scientists agree that 
uninhabitable land can be transformed into 
habitat, the majority opinion asserts that at 
least one “physical or biological feature[] . . . 
essential to the conservation of the species” 
must be present to permit the Service to 
declare land that is uninhabitable by the 
species to be “critical habitat.” It must be 
emphasized that this is the linchpin to the 
majority’s holding. When the only potential 
use of an area for conservation is use as 
habitat, the Service cannot designate 
uninhabitable land as “critical habitat,” the 
majority opinion concedes, even if scientists 
agree that the land could be altered to become 
habitat. But, the opinion says, if, as in the 
present case, there is at least one physical or 
biological feature essential to the 
conservation of the species (also 
denominated by the Service as a primary 
constituent element, as explained in footnote 
12 of the majority opinion), the presence of 
one, and only one, of three indispensable 
physical or biological features required for 
habitat is sufficient to allow the Service to 
designate uninhabitable land as “critical 
habitat.” The opinion says: 
 
Here, the Service confirmed through 
peer review and two rounds of notice 
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and comment a scientific consensus 
as to the presence and rarity of a 
critical (and difficult to reproduce) 
feature—the ephemeral ponds—
which justified its finding that Unit 1 
was essential for the conservation of 
the dusky gopher frog. 
 
This re-writes the Endangered 
Species Act. It permits the Service to 
designate an area as “critical habitat” if it has 
“a critical feature” even though the area is 
uninhabitable and does not play a supporting 
role to an area that is habitat. Neither the 
words “a critical feature” nor such a concept 
appear in the Act. The touchstone chosen by 
Congress was “essential.” The existence of a 
single, even if rare, physical characteristic 
does not render an area “essential” when the 
area cannot support the species because of the 
lack of other necessary physical 
characteristics 
 
The majority opinion’s reasoning also 
suffers from internal inconsistency. The 
opinion asserts that, unlike land that is 
occupied by the species, there is no 
requirement under the Endangered Species 
Act that unoccupied land “must contain all of 
the relevant [physical or biological features]” 
that are “essential to the conservation of the 
species” before the Secretary may designate 
it as critical habitat. This clearly implies, if 
not states, that the Secretary can designate 
unoccupied land as critical habitat even if the 
land has no primary constituent physical or 
biological element (to use the Service’s 
vernacular) essential to the conservation of 
the species. If land can be “essential for the 
conservation of the species” even when it has 
no physical or biological features essential to 
the conservation of the species, then what, 
exactly, is it about the land that permits the 
Service to find it “essential”? The majority 
opinion does not answer this question. 
Instead, a few pages after making the 
assertion that unoccupied land can be 
designated even when it has no features 
essential to the conservation of the species, 
the opinion rejects this proposition. The 
majority opinion says (in attempting to 
counter the argument that its holding would 
permit the Service to designate an empty field 
as critical habitat even though not habitable) 
that it would be arbitrary and capricious for 
the Service to find an empty field “essential” 
if there were other similar fields. The opinion 
concludes that if land that is uninhabitable 
could be modified to become habitat, the 
Service could not deem the land “essential” if 
there were other parcels of land similar to it 
that could also be modified: 
 
We fail to see how the Service would 
be able to similarly justify as rational 
an essentiality finding as to arbitrarily 
chosen land. In contrast, the dissent, 
similar to the Landowners, contends 
that “[i]t is easily conceivable that 
‘the best scientific data available’ 
would lead scientists to conclude that 
an empty field that is not currently 
habitable could be altered to become 
habitat for an endangered species.” 
Even assuming that to be true, it does 
not follow that scientists or the 
Service would or could then 
reasonably call an empty field 
essential for the conservation of a 
species. If the field in question were 
no different than any other empty 
field, what would make it essential? 
Presumably, if the field could be 
modified into suitable habitat, so 
could any of the one hundred or one 
thousand other similar fields. If the 
fields are fungible, it would be 
arbitrary for the Service to label any 
single one “essential” to the 
conservation of a species. It is only by 
overlooking this point that the dissent 
can maintain that our approval of the 
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Service’s reading of “essential” will 
“mean[] that virtually any part of the 
United States could be designated as 
‘critical habitat’ for any given 
endangered species so long as the 
property could be modified in a way 
that would support introduction and 
subsequent conservation of the 
species on it.” 
 
I have difficulty with this reasoning. 
There is undeniably a textual difference in the 
Endangered Species Act between the sections 
dealing with an area occupied by the species 
and an area unoccupied by that species. If 
Congress did in fact intend to authorize the 
Service to designate unoccupied land as 
“critical habitat” even if it had no “physical 
or biological features . . . essential to the 
conservation of the species” but could be 
modified to become habitat, then it would not 
seem to be arbitrary or capricious for the 
Service to designate any particular parcel of 
land as critical habitat, even if there were 
other similar lands. The intent of Congress 
would be that land can be designated if the 
survival of the species depends on creating 
habitat for it. If this were in fact the intent of 
Congress, it would not be reasonable to say 
that because there is an abundance of land 
that could be modified to save the species, 
none of it can be designated. But the majority 
opinion is unwilling to construe the Act in 
such a manner, because, as the opinion 
explains, Congress used the word “essential” 
as a meaningful limit on the authority of the 
Service to designate “critical habitat.” The 
opinion reasons, “[i]f the fields [that could be 
modified] are fungible, it would be arbitrary 
for the Service to label any single one 
‘essential’ to the conservation of the species.” 
Acknowledging that land lacking any 
features necessary for habitat cannot be 
“essential” to the conservation of the species, 
the opinion finds it necessary to construct a 
tortured interpretation of the Act to affirm 
what the Service has done in this case. That 
interpretation is as follows: land with no 
physical or biological features essential to the 
conservation of the species that is not 
occupied by the species but could be 
modified to become habitable can be deemed 
“essential” and designated as critical habitat, 
but only if there are virtually no other tracts 
similar to it, or land that is uninhabitable by 
the species but that has at least one physical 
or biological feature can be designated as 
critical habitat if the land can be modified to 
create all the other physical or biological 
features necessary to transform it into habitat 
for the species. I do not think that the word 
“essential” can bear the weight that the 
majority opinion places upon it in arriving at 
its interpretation of the Act. 
 
The majority opinion strenuously 
denies that its holding allows the Service to 
“designate any land as critical habitat 
whenever it contains a single one of the 
‘physical or biological features’ essential to 
the conservation of the species at issue.” But 
the opinion’s ensuing explanation illustrates 
that is precisely the import of its holding: “if 
the ponds are essential, then Unit 1, which 
contains the ponds, is essential for the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog.” The 
Service itself found, based on scientific data, 
that the ponds are only one of three “primary 
constituent elements” that are “essential to 
the conservation of the species.” The other 
two primary constituent elements are not 
present on Unit 1 and would require 
substantial modification of Unit 1 to create 
them. 
 
The Service’s construction of the 
Endangered Species Act is not entitled to any 
deference because it goes beyond what the 
meaning of “essential” can encompass. The 
Service’s construction of the Act is 
impermissible, and the Service exceeded its 
statutory authority. 
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III 
 
The majority opinion quotes a 
Supreme Court decision, which says: 
“[w]hen examining this kind of scientific 
determination, as opposed to simple findings 
of fact, a reviewing court must generally be 
at its most deferential.” However, the panel’s 
majority opinion does not identify any 
finding by the Service as being “this kind of 
scientific determination.” Instead, the 
opinion appears to address the proper 
interpretation of “essential for the 
conservation of the species,” as applied to the 
point of contention in this case, as a question 
of law based on the words Congress chose. 
 
The fact that scientific evidence was 
a part of the proceedings leading to the Final 
Rule does not mean that all determinations in 
the Final Rule are subject to deference by a 
reviewing court. No one disputes that 
reputable scientists made valid 
determinations in the administrative 
proceedings undertaken by the Service. 
However, the scientific evidence and 
conclusions have no bearing on the issue of 
statutory construction about which the parties 
in this case disagree: Did Congress intend to 
permit the designation of land as “critical 
habitat” when the land is not occupied by an 
endangered species and would have to be 
substantially modified then periodically 
maintained in order to be used as habitat, and 
when there is no indication that the land will 
in fact be modified or maintained in such a 
manner? 
 
IV 
 
The phrase “essential for the 
conservation of the species” requires more 
than a theoretical possibility that an area 
designated as “critical habitat” will be 
transformed such that its physical 
characteristics are essential to the 
conservation of the species. There is no 
evidence that it is probable that Unit 1 will be 
physically modified in the manner that the 
scientists uniformly agree would be 
necessary to sustain a dusky gopher frog 
population. The conclusion by the Service 
that Unit 1 is “essential for the conservation 
of the species” is therefore not supported by 
substantial evidence, and the designation of 
Unit 1 as “critical habitat” should be vacated 
under the APA. 
 
The Service recognized in the Final 
Rule that under the Endangered Species Act 
and regulations implementing it, the Service 
is “required to identify the physical or 
biological features essential to the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog in 
areas occupied at the time of listing, focusing 
on the features’ primary constituent 
elements.” The Service explained that “[w]e 
consider primary constituent elements to be 
the elements of physical or biological 
features that, when laid out in the appropriate 
quantity and spatial arrangement to provide 
for a species’ life-history processes, are 
essential to the conservation of the species.” 
The Service identified three primary 
constituent elements, briefly summarized as 
ephemeral wetland habitat with an open 
canopy (with certain specific characteristics), 
upland forested nonbreeding habitat 
dominated by longleaf pine maintained by 
fires frequent enough to support an open 
canopy and abundant herbaceous ground 
cover, and upland habitat between breeding 
and nonbreeding habitat that is characterized 
by an open canopy, abundant native 
herbaceous species, and a subsurface 
structure that provides shelter for dusky 
gopher frogs during seasonal movements.  
 
The other eleven units designated in 
the Final Rule had all three constituent 
elements. However, the Service found that 
Unit 1 has only one of the three primary 
 169 
constituent elements detailed in the Final 
Rule—the ephemeral ponds. Isolated 
wetlands, like the ephemeral ponds that exist 
on Unit 1, are necessary to sustain a 
population of the species as a breeding 
ground. But frogs do not spend most of their 
lives breeding in ponds, and the existence of 
the ponds will not alone provide the 
necessary habitat. “Both forested uplands and 
isolated wetlands . . . are needed to provide 
space for individual and population growth 
and for normal behavior.” The Service found 
that dusky gopher frogs “spend most of their 
lives underground in forested habitat 
consisting of fire-maintained, open-
canopied, pine woodlands historically 
dominated by longleaf pine.” Unit 1 is 
covered with a closed-canopy forest of 
loblolly pines.  
 
The Service also identified the 
alterations and special management that 
would be required within the areas 
designated as critical habit, including Unit 1, 
to sustain a dusky gopher frog population. 
The Service found with regard to Unit 1 that 
“[a]lthough the uplands associated with the 
ponds do not currently contain the essential 
physical or biological features of critical 
habitat, we believe them to be restorable with 
reasonable effort.” This finding is 
insufficient to sustain the conclusion that 
Unit 1 is “essential for the conservation of the 
species” for at least two reasons. First, 
finding that the uplands are “restorable” is 
not a finding that the areas will be “restored.” 
Unless the uplands are restored, they cannot 
be and are not essential for the conservation 
of the frog. Second, the Service does not 
explain who will expend the “reasonable 
effort” necessary to restore the uplands. In 
sum, the designation of Unit 1 as critical 
habitat is not supported by substantial 
evidence because there is no evidence that 
Unit 1 will be modified in such a way that it 
can serve as habitat for the frog. 
In fact, the Service itself concluded 
that it is entirely speculative as to whether 
Unit 1 will be transformed from its current 
use for commercial timber operations into 
dusky gopher frog habitat by removing the 
loblolly pines and replacing them with 
longleaf pines, and by the other activities 
necessary to create frog habitat. The Service 
was required by the Endangered Species Act 
to assess the economic impact of designating 
critical habitat. The Service recognized that 
as to Unit 1, the economic impact depended 
on the extent to which it might be developed, 
and accordingly, whether section 7 
consultation would be required because of a 
federal nexus. Section 7 consultation would 
provide at least some potential that the 
owners of the land would be required to take 
measures to create habitat for the dusky 
gopher frog in order to obtain federal permits 
that would allow development. But the 
Service specifically found that “considerable 
uncertainty exists regarding the likelihood of 
a Federal nexus for development activities” 
on Unit 1, and that only the “potential exists 
for the Service to recommend conservation 
measures if consultation were to occur.” This 
does not constitute substantial, or even any, 
evidence that Unit 1 is now or will become 
suitable habitat for the dusky gopher frog, 
which is the only basis on which the Service 
has ever posited that Unit 1 is “essential for 
the conservation of the species.” (As 
discussed above, the Service has never 
contended that Unit 1 is essential because of 
support that it provides to another area that is 
occupied by the frog.) 
 
The Service described three different 
scenarios to assess the potential economic 
impact of the Final Rule. In the first scenario, 
“no conservation measures are implemented 
for the species.” The Service reasoned that 
development on Unit 1 might avoid any 
federal nexus and therefore no consultation 
would be required, and no conservation of the 
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species would occur. The Service therefore 
expressly recognized that Unit 1 may never 
play any role in the “conservation of the 
species.”  
 
In the Service’s second scenario, the 
Service assumes that development is sought 
by the owners, section 7 consultation occurs 
that results in development on 40% of Unit 1, 
and the remaining 60% is managed as dusky 
gopher frog habitat. (The Service estimates 
that the landowners would suffer a loss of 
$20.4 million due to the loss of the option to 
develop 60% of the area.) This is the only 
scenario, in the entirety of the Final Rule, that 
explains how, at least theoretically, Unit 1’s 
landscape would be altered so that it could be 
used as dusky gopher frog habitat. But the 
Service made no findings that this scenario 
was likely or probable. 
 
Under Scenario 3, the Service 
assumes that the owners desire to develop 
Unit 1, section 7 consultation occurs, but no 
development is permitted on Unit 1 by the 
Government “due to the importance of the 
unit in the conservation and recovery of the 
species. (The Service estimates that the loss 
of the option to develop 100% of Unit 1 
would result in a loss of $33.9 million to the 
owners.) Significantly, the Service does not 
posit that any of Unit 1 would actually be 
used as dusky gopher frog habitat under 
Scenario 3, in spite of its alleged 
“importance” to conservation. Undoubtedly, 
that is because if the federal government 
would not permit the landowners to develop 
any part of Unit 1, why would the owners 
undertake to modify Unit 1 so that it could be 
used as frog habitat? The Government has no 
plans to pay for the creation of habitat on Unit 
1. Habitat will only be created, and therefore 
conservation will only occur, if the owners 
decide to modify their property. The only 
evidence in the record is that the owners do 
not plan to do so and there is no evidence that 
the economic or other considerations would 
lead a reasonable landowner to create frog 
habitat on Unit 1.  
 
Scenario 3 shows, in the starkest of 
terms, why the Service’s position that Unit 1 
is “essential for the conservation of the 
species” is illogical on its face. Even if the 
Government does not allow any development 
on Unit 1 because of the existence of the 
ephemeral ponds, the Government is aware 
that Unit 1 cannot be used for the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog 
because someone or some entity would have 
to significantly modify Unit 1 to make it 
suitable for frog habitat. Unsuitable habitat is 
not essential for the conservation of the 
species. 
 
*      *       * 
 
 I would vacate the Final Rule’s 
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat, and I 
therefore dissent. 
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“ U.S. top court takes up property rights case involving endangered frog” 
 
 
Reuters 
 
Lawrence Hurley 
 
January 22, 2018 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
hear a bid by timber company Weyerhaeuser 
Co seeking to limit the federal government’s 
power to designate private land as protected 
habitat for endangered species in a case 
involving a warty amphibian called the dusky 
gopher frog. 
Weyerhaeuser harvests timber on the 
Louisiana land in question and is backed in 
the case by business groups including the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Weyerhaeuser 
challenged a lower court ruling upholding a 
2012 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service decision 
to include private land where the frog does 
not currently live as critical habitat, 
potentially putting restrictions on future 
development opportunities. 
 
The case pits property rights against federal 
conservation measures. The frog, found only 
in four locations in southern Mississippi, also 
previously inhabited Louisiana and Alabama. 
 
The U.S. government identified the 
Louisiana land partly owned by 
Weyerhaeuser, which is based in Washington 
state, as meeting the criteria for the frog’s 
habitat under the federal Endangered Species 
Act. 
 
“This was a decision that cried out for 
review,” said the company’s lawyer, Timothy 
Bishop, adding that federal law is “absolutely 
clear that critical habitat must first be 
habitat.” 
 
The Fish and Wildlife Service did not 
immediately respond to a request for 
comment. 
 
The agency’s critical habitat designation 
covered the tract of 1,544 acres (about 625 
hectares) of private land in Louisiana as well 
as nearly 5,000 acres (about 2,025 hectares) 
in Mississippi. The owners of the Louisiana 
land filed a legal challenge to the designation, 
saying it would infringe on their rights to use 
the property as they see fit. 
 
The frog has been listed as endangered under 
the federal Endangered Species Act since 
2001. Critical habitat is defined as an area 
essential to the conservation of a species that 
may require special management or 
protection. 
 
The Fish and Wildlife Service described the 
frog as darkly colored and moderately sized 
with warts covering its back and dusky spots 
on its belly. 
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The New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the 
government in 2016. The Supreme Court, 
due to hear the case in its next term that starts 
in October, did not act on a similar appeal 
brought by owners of other parcels of the 
Louisiana land. 
 
In another endangered species case, the 
Supreme Court on Monday rejected a 
challenge to federal protections for a rare 
type of seal that were based on projections of 
future loss of habitat attributed to climate 
change. 
 
In declining to hear appeals brought by the 
state of Alaska and industry groups, the 
justices left in place a 2012 decision by the 
administration of former President Barack 
Obama to protect a bearded seal subspecies 
that mainly lives off the coast of Alaska. 
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“Ex-DOI Officials Urge Justices to Keep Frog Habitat Ruling” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Danielle Nichole Smith 
 
July 9, 2018   
 
Former U.S. Department of the 
Interior leaders have thrown their support 
behind the federal government in a challenge 
at the U.S. Supreme Court to the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service’s finding that 1,500 
acres of private property in Louisiana were 
critical habitat for an endangered frog 
species. 
 
The former officials — whose tenures ranged 
from Nixon’s administration to Obama’s — 
said in their Friday amicus brief that the 
Louisiana land didn’t have to be currently 
occupied by the dusky gopher frog or 
presently able to support the species in order 
to be designated as critical habitat. A ruling 
to the contrary, which Weyerhaeuser Co. and 
other forest landowners argued for in their 
challenge to the Fifth Circuit’s affirmation of 
the service’s decision, would undermine 
conservation efforts, the officials said. 
 
“It is unlikely that Congress would have 
intended federal agencies to act with such 
disregard for the recovery prospects of 
endangered species,” the former officials 
said. “Yet, that would be the practical result 
of a ruling that land that has been sufficiently 
altered that it cannot be occupied cannot be 
designated as critical habitat, even though it 
offers the best prospects for successful 
restoration of all formerly occupied sites.” 
The officials also said that the landowners’ 
contention that they would suffer financial 
harm from the decision overlooked the fact 
that a critical habitat designation seldomly 
burdened private property owners. The 
Interior Department would often work with 
private landowners to prevent a 
determination that would hinder their 
development plans, the officials said. 
 
Further, the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
decisions not to exclude lands from a critical 
habitat determination were discretionary and 
allowing judicial review of those choices 
would be “administratively unworkable,” the 
officials said. 
 
“Many critical habitat designations 
encompass hundreds of thousands of acres 
and include large numbers of individual 
parcels, each with a different owner,” the 
officials said. “In such circumstances, there is 
an almost limitless number of exclusion 
possibilities, particularly since the exclusion 
of any one area may make essential the 
designation of other areas.” 
 
And the former officials weren’t the only 
ones to back the Fish and Wildlife Service on 
Friday, as scientists, professors, small 
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businesses and others also filed amici briefs 
in the case. A group of amphibian scientists 
with a focus on gopher frogs chimed in as 
well, saying that the area designated as a 
critical habitat was essential for conserving 
the dusky gopher frog. 
 
The controversy stems from the Fish and 
Wildlife Service’s decision to include 1,544 
acres in Louisiana, known as Unit 1, in the 
nearly 6,500 acres it determined were critical 
habitat for the endangered dusky gopher frog. 
Weyerhaeuser along with Markle Interests 
LLC, P&F Lumber Co. 2000 LLC and PF 
Monroe Properties LLC — which 
collectively make up the owners of Unit 1 — 
appealed the finding to the Fifth 
Circuit, which sided with the federal agency 
in June 2016. 
 
After the full Fifth Circuit voted 8-6 not to 
rehear the case, the landowners petitioned the 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and 
the high court agreed to take up the case in 
January. 
 
The landowners argued in their briefs before 
the Supreme Court that the Endangered 
Species Act required critical habitats to be 
locations where a species currently lived and 
was able to reside. The Fish and Wildlife 
Service’s critical habitat determination for 
the dusky gopher frogs “stretches the 
statutory term far beyond its breaking,” 
Weyerhaeuser said in its brief. 
 
Weyerhaeuser on Monday told Law360 that 
the company supports species conservation 
efforts, noting that it participated in 10 
habitat conservation plans, candidate 
conservation agreements and safe harbor 
agreements. 
 
“However, in this case, designation was 
applied to a tract of land where the species 
has not been present for decades and where 
the specific habitat conditions it requires do 
not exist,” the company said. “We applaud 
the court for taking up this case and we’re 
hopeful the outcome will ensure a 
designation cannot be made to an area 
without firm evidence that it supports the 
endangered or threatened species in 
question.” 
 
The federal government doesn’t comment on 
pending litigation. Counsel for the remaining 
parties didn’t respond Monday to requests for 
comment. 
 
Weyerhaeuser Co. is represented by Richard 
C. Stanley of Stanley Reuter Ross Thornton 
& Alford LLC, James R. Johnston and 
Zachary R. Hiatt of Weyerhaeuser Co., and 
Timothy S. Bishop, Chad M. Clamage and 
Jed W. Glickstein of Mayer Brown LLP. 
 
Markle Interests and the other property 
owners are represented by Damien M. Schiff, 
Anthony L. François, Oliver J. Dunford, 
Christina M. Martin and Jonathan Wood of 
the Pacific Legal Foundation, and Edward B. 
Poitevent II of Stone Pigman Walther 
Wittman LLC. 
 
The federal agencies are represented by Noel 
J. Francisco, Jeffrey H. Wood, Mary 
Hollingsworth, Edwin S. Kneedler, Jeffrey E. 
Sandberg, Andrew C. Mergen and J. David 
Gunter II of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
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The former officials are represented by Ann 
E. Prezyna and Jessica N. Walder of Lane 
Powell PC. 
 
The case is Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service et al., case number 17-
71, in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
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The Fifth Circuit on Thursday rejected timber 
giant Weyerhaeuser Co.’s appeal of the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to 
declare 1,600 acres of private property in 
Louisiana as a refuge for the endangered 
dusky gopher frog. 
 
Weyerhaeuser and other landowners in the 
area argued that the FWS overstepped its 
authority by designating their land in St. 
Tammany Parish, Louisiana, as a “critical 
habitat” that could be used to revive the 
species, which is teetering on the edge of 
extinction with fewer than 100 adult frogs 
left. They said the designation would cost 
them millions of dollars and that the land isn’t 
a suitable habitat for the creatures anyway. 
But the Fifth Circuit disagreed. 
 
To begin with, the appeals panel shot down 
the landowners’ claim that the FWS 
exceeded its authority under the Endangered 
Species Act by designating the area as critical 
habitat despite it not being “essential for the 
conservation of the species.” 
 
“Congress has not defined the word 
‘essential’ in the ESA. Hence the service has 
the authority to interpret the term,” the panel 
said. 
 
While the landowners said it is an 
unreasonable interpretation of the ESA to 
describe the habitat as essential for the 
conservation of the dusky gopher frog even 
though it’s not currently habitable by the 
frog, the panel said there is no habitability 
requirement in the text of the ESA or the 
implementing regulations. 
 
“The statute requires the service to designate 
‘essential’ areas, without further defining 
‘essential’ to mean ‘habitable,’” the panel 
said. 
 
After determining the service’s designation 
of the landowners’ property as critical habitat 
was not arbitrary and capricious, the panel 
also rejected their argument that the ESA 
exceeds Congress’ powers under the 
Commerce Clause. 
 
The landowners acknowledged that the 
critical-habitat provision of the ESA is a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause authority, but they said the 
designation of their property as critical 
habitat for the dusky gopher frog was an 
intrastate, not interstate, activity. 
 
The landowners said that instead of 
aggregating the effect of designating their 
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property with the effect of other critical-
habitat dusky gopher frog designations in 
other states like Mississippi, the panel should 
analyze the commercial impact of the critical 
habitat designation independent of all other 
designations. 
 
But the panel said the U.S. Supreme 
Court already decided that question in United 
States v. Morrison, holding that courts should 
consider whether the intrastate activity “in 
question has been some sort of economic 
endeavor.” The panel said that’s the case in 
this matter. 
 
And the panel also rejected the landowners’ 
contention that the FWS violated the 
National Environmental Policy Act by failing 
to prepare an environmental impact statement 
before designating the property as critical 
habitat. 
 
“The designation of [the habitat] does not 
trigger NEPA’s impact-statement 
requirement because the designation ‘does 
not effect changes to the physical 
environment,’” the panel said. 
 
The other plaintiffs are Markle Interests LLC, 
P&F Lumber Co. 2000 LLC, and PF Monroe 
Properties LLC. 
 
The landowners are represented by Richard 
C. Stanley of Stanley Reuter Ross Thornton 
& Alford LLC and M. Reed Hopper 
of Pacific Legal Foundation. 
 
The FWS is represented by Luther L. Hajek, 
Mary Hollingsworth and David C. Shilton of 
the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
The case is Markle Interests LLC et al. v. 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service et al., case 
number 14-31008, in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circui
